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FROM GAUDIN TO GILES: CONTEXT, EQUITY, AND THE
ADMISSION OF “WORDS FROM THE GRAVE” AGAINST
THE ACCUSED KILLER
Liza I. Karsai*

I. INTRODUCTION
“If anything happens to me, Bobbie did it.” Such explosively
powerful evidence can be admitted at Bobbie’s homicide trial to prove
that Bobbie did in fact do it, on the ground that Bobbie’s conduct
constituted a forfeiture of her objections to the admission of the
evidence. Traditionally used to level the playing field when a defendant
thwarted the prosecution by causing a witness to become unavailable for
live testimony, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is increasingly
used in homicide cases as a means of admitting the victim’s otherwise
inadmissible hearsay statements against the victim’s accused killer. 1
Coined “reflexive application” of forfeiture by wrongdoing because both
judge and jury must decide the same factual “predicate,” its basic tenet
is that admission of the victim’s words against the accused killer is
warranted where the victim has been silenced by the very act of
homicide for which the defendant has been hailed before the court. 2
Scholars who advocate reflexive application of forfeiture by
wrongdoing have called the defendant’s assertion of his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses, and of his objections to hearsay,
“chutzpa” 3 The potential for reflexive application of forfeiture by

* Associate Professor, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School. The author would like to thank
Dean Richard Lynn, Professor Lee Adams, and Professor Helen de Haven for their support and for their
comments on drafts of this Article. She would also like to thank Professor Jeffrey van Detta and
Professor Michael Kent for their encouragement and insight as well as Nicole Page for her invaluable
research assistance.
1. See, e.g., State v. Calhoun, No. 91328, 2009 WL 1419498, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. May
21, 2009) (applying forfeiture by wrongdoing where defendant was charged with aggravated homicide
for killing victim who was expected to testify against defendant at attempted homicide trial).
2. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR. L. REV. 506, 506,
508, 522 (1997) [hereinafter Friedman, Chutzpa]; Josephine Ross, When Murder Alone Is Not Enough;
Forfeiture of the Confrontation Clause After Giles, 24 CRIM. J. 24, 35–36 (2009). Professor Friedman
analogizes the homicide defendant’s assertion of his Confrontation Clause right and hearsay objections
to “the man who kills both his parents and then begs the sentencing court to have mercy on an orphan.”
Friedman, Chutzpa, supra, at 517. But who should decide whether the man is guilty of killing his
parents?
3. Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 506; Ross, supra note 2, at 35–36.
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wrongdoing to greatly increase the likelihood of conviction has been the
subject of significant lay press coverage in connection with highly
publicized homicide prosecutions, such as the Drew Peterson case and
the Mark Jensen murder-by-antifreeze trial. 4 Legal commentators have
lauded the doctrine’s potential for aiding convictions of perpetrators of
domestic violence. 5
But, who is to decide whether the defendant killed the victim—judge,
or jury? When applied reflexively, a rule that “[d]efendants with
unclean hands should not be able to invoke the constitutional
confrontation doctrine and the hearsay rules in their defense” 6 strips
constitutional protections from those defendants deemed likely to be
guilty, thereby increasing the likelihood of a guilty verdict, while other
defendants, believed to be less likely culpable, retain their rights and
enjoy greater likelihood of acquittal. 7
The Supreme Court’s holding in Giles v. California, that the
Confrontation Clause demands that a purpose of the killing be to prevent
the victim from becoming a testifying witness, does not adequately
4. Anderson Cooper 360: President Obama’s Supreme Court Pick?; Small Town, Big Change –
Part 2 (CNN television broadcast May 22, 2009), transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0905/22/acd.01.html (discussing case against Drew Petersen and question of
admissibility of victim’s statements to friends and families under forfeiture by wrongdoing rule); Larry
King Live: Drew Peterson Arrested in Connection With Death of Third Wife; Interview With Kate of
‘Jon & Kate Plus 8’; Maria Shriver’s Heartbreaking Battle (CNN television broadcast May 7, 2009),
transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0905/07/ lkl.01.html; Julie Manganis,
DA: Suspect Took Photos of Girlfriend’s Murder, EAGLE-TRIBUNE, June 10, 2008, available at
http://www.eagletribune.com/local/x1876436637/DA-Suspect-took-photos-of-girlfriends-murder/print
(reporting prosecutor’s intent to introduce victim’s prior statements under forfeiture by wrongdoing
rule); Barbara Grzincic, MD Woman Who Killed Husband Wins New Sentence, THE DAILY RECORD,
May 2, 2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4183/ is_20050502/ai_n14609666/
(discussing insurance fraud case in which defendant, paradoxically—and unsuccessfully—argued that
her deceased husband’s statements that she would kill him were admissible under forfeiture by
wrongdoing only in the murder trial, but not in the insurance fraud trial).
5. Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their
Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 889–90 (2009) [hereinafter Lininger, The Sound of Silence]; Tom
Donaldson, Combating Victim/Witness Intimidation in Family Violence Cases: A Response to Critics of
the “Forfeiture by Wrongdoing” Confrontation Exception Resurrected by the Supreme Court in
Crawford and Davis, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 643, 699–700 (2008) (arguing that “fully functional wrongdoing
exception is essential to combat victim/witness intimidation” such that a person who seeks assistance in
ending domestic violence should be considered witnesses for purpose of doctrine).
6. Lininger, The Sound of Silence, supra note 5, at 911.
7. Compare People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that it
was not an error for the trial court to find that defendant’s knowledge that he would be prosecuted for
prior domestic abuse and that victim would testify at those proceedings, such that purpose of killing was
to prevent victim’s testimony), with Ivy v. Tennessee, No. W2003-00786-CCa-R3-DD, 2004 WL
3021146 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in
applying forfeiture by wrongdoing where, although defendant had made statements supporting his intent
to kill victim if she involved the police, proceedings at which victim would testify were “potential”
future proceedings at the time of the homicide).
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address whether reflexive application of the doctrine undermines other
constitutional rights. 8 Of some note, Giles does not bar states from
applying forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively, without finding the
defendant’s purpose, to admit hearsay statements that do not implicate
the Confrontation Clause. 9 In such cases, a judge could apply forfeiture
if he or she believed that the defendant more likely than not killed the
victim, thus making it more likely that a jury would find that the
defendant killed the victim. 10 But whether under the Giles rule
requiring purpose or under the more expansive rule potentially applied
to non-testimonial hearsay statements, reflexive application of forfeiture
by wrongdoing in a homicide case requires a judicial fact-finding that
the defendant killed the victim, one of the elements of the crime
charged, before the jury has convicted the defendant. 11 This factfinding, generally by a preponderance of the evidence, 12 then becomes
part (or, in the case of a state’s expansive application of forfeiture by
wrongdoing to statements that do not implicate the right to confront
witnesses, the entire) basis for admitting otherwise inadmissible
evidence against the defendant.
Although some view Giles as a “windfall” for murderers because it
curtails the reach of reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing

8. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376–77 (2008). However, all nine Justices were united in
supporting the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Id. Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas,
Alito, and Ginsberg were united in the view that defendant must have killed the victim with the
“purpose” of preventing the victim from being a witness, while Justice Souter—although concurring—
apparently would have required only “intent.” Id. at 364–65, 379–80. Justices Breyer, Stevens and
Kennedy would not have imposed a “purpose” requirement for a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing
and would have allowed a more expansive use of the doctrine. Id. at 405–06.
9. Id. at 376.
10. Id.
11. Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford World, 71 MO. L.
REV. 285, 308–09 (2006) (discussing circularity of “automatic forfeiture”—e.g., reflexive application
with no intent or purpose requirement). Forfeiture by wrongdoing may be used as a ground to admit a
homicide victim’s statements in a trial against a defendant where the homicide victim was expected to
testify—e.g., if the victim is killed shortly before the alleged killer’s trial on drug trafficking charges—
as well as in the homicide trial itself. Compare United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 269–72 (2d
Cir. 1982) (defendant convicted of drug charges forfeited objections to testimony of witness killed
during first trial), and State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Minn. 1980) (applying forfeiture by
wrongdoing to admit hearsay statements of witness who refused to testify after she reported that
defendant threatened her and her family if she testified), with United States v. Vallee, 304 F. App’x 916,
920 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that homicide for which defendant was charged provided basis for forfeiture
ruling). Only the latter provides overlap between the required judicial fact-finding and the jury’s
required fact-finding.
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 172 (Mass. 2005) (preponderance);
People v. Hagos, No. 05CA2296, 2009 WL 3464284, at *22 (Colo. App. Oct. 29, 2009)
(preponderance). Cf. People v. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 367 (1995) (adopting clear and convincing
evidence standard in New York).
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when the Confrontation Clause is implicated, 13 this Article suggests that
the Giles ruling nonetheless fails to resolve an underlying discontinuity
with the Court’s historical interpretation of a different triumvirate of
constitutional rights accorded a criminal defendant. In United States v.
Gaudin, a unanimous Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
demand that every element of the charged crime, and not just the factual
components of the essential elements, be submitted to a jury for decision
under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 14 In Gaudin, the Court
recognized that context could affect whether judicial fact-finding
violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, Fifth
Amendment right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and Fifth
Amendment right to due process. 15
Gaudin’s holding appears facially unrelated to the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine addressed in Giles, but, as this Article discusses,
Giles’s continued approval of the reflexive application of forfeiture by
wrongdoing implicates the very core of Gaudin’s holding because the
Court did not consider the context of forfeiture by wrongdoing and how
that differs from the context of preliminary questions of evidentiary
admissibility, which are ordinarily appropriately allocated to the judge
for decision. This Article suggests that reflexive application of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine cannot be easily reconciled with
Gaudin’s holding or its reasoning, and considers the extent to which it
undermines the constitutional rights linked by the Court in Gaudin. Part
II discusses the rights linked by Gaudin. Part III then addresses
forfeiture by wrongdoing and its recent expansion to the reflexive case,
while Part IV closely examines Giles. Part V considers the Supreme
Court’s authorization of reflexive application.
Finally, Part VI
concludes that the allocation of fact-finding to judges in the reflexive
case violates the constitutional principles addressed by Gaudin.

13. Lininger, The Sound of Silence, supra note 5, at 863–64 (calling decision a “windfall” for
some defendants and discussing authorities predicting that Giles will have dire consequences for
domestic abuse prosecutions).
14. Gaudin v. United States, 515 U.S. 506, 511–12, 522–23 (1995). The Court explained that the
context might dictate allocation to the judge if a preliminary question of the admissibility of evidence,
such as whether evidence should be excluded as seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but to the
jury “when it is one of the elements of the crime of depriving a person of constitutional rights under
color of law . . . .” Id. at 521.
15. Id. at 510, 511 n.1, 522–23. See also Colleen P. Murphy, Context and the Allocation of
Decisionmaking: Reflections on United States v. Gaudin, 82 VA. L. REV. 961, 964 (1996) (arguing that
the Court’s use of “the context of ‘elements of the offense’ to determine whether certain questions must
be decided by the jury” is “too narrow” and led to the Court’s unsupported allocation of offense-related
sentencing factors to the court rather than the jury).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS LINKED BY GAUDIN
In Gaudin, the Supreme Court held that the interrelated nature of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments requires every element of a criminal charge
be submitted to the jury for determination by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 16 The issue in Gaudin was whether the Constitution required a
trial judge to submit to the jury the question of the “materiality” of a
false statement in a criminal prosecution for making “material false
statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.”17
Before the Supreme Court, the government argued that materiality was a
“legal” question, and therefore, was not a factual component of an
essential element of the crime that must be presented to the jury. 18
Led by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the
government’s position finding first that the inquiry into materiality was
the sort of “‘mixed question of law and fact’ . . . [that] has typically been
resolved by juries,” and second, there was no case law leaving the jury
with only factual questions and removing from the jury the ultimate
application of law to fact. 19 Any “device,” such as a statutory inference
or presumption, passes constitutional muster only if it does “‘not
undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence
adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” 20
To reach its holding, the Court first reaffirmed the linkage of two
important constitutional rights—the Fifth Amendment right to due
process and the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial—noting its prior
holding in Sullivan v. Louisiana 21 that “these provisions require criminal
convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty
of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 22 Implicit in this language is the Court’s recognition
that, as put by the Sullivan Court:
the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt

16. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522–23.
17. Id. at 507. The defendant, a real estate broker and developer, was charged with equityskimming and making false statements on loan settlement statements and appraisal report forms in
violation of federal law. United States v. Gaudin, 986 F.2d 1267, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d 515
U.S. 506 (1995). The crime of making false statements to a federal agency was governed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1988), which was interpreted as containing an element of materiality. Gaudin, 986 F.2d at
1271.
18. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511–12. See also Murphy, supra note 15, at 965.
19. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512–13.
20. Id. at 514–15 (quoting Court of Ulster County. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)).
21. 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993).
22. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510.
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and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated.
It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that
the defendant is probably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to
determine (as Winship requires) whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 23

The Court emphasized the historical importance of the right to a jury
trial, tracing its “impressive pedigree” to England, where the right was
viewed as “‘the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties.’”24
The Court also completed the task of repudiating its 1929 decision in
Sinclair v. United States, which had held that in a prosecution for
criminal contempt of a witness before Congress who refused to answer a
“pertinent” question, “pertinency” was a question of law for the court. 25
The Gaudin Court reasoned that the context of a fact determination is
important to evaluating the constitutionality of allocations between
judge and jury. 26 Justice Scalia emphasized that “the same mixed
question of law and fact” could be appropriately allocated to “the court
for one purpose, and to the jury for another.” 27 If probable cause “arises
in the context of a motion to suppress,” it is appropriately allocated to
the judge. 28 But if probable cause is an element of the crime charged,
then it is for the jury. 29
The Court also distinguished Kungys v. United States, which had held
that the question of materiality in a denaturalization proceeding could be
decided by an appellate court rather than by the trial court on remand, 30
noting that the context of the fact-finding function was different. 31
Kungys was focused on whether an appellate court could decide the
question in a non-jury denaturalization proceeding, while Gaudin
concerned the constitutionality of a court finding of materiality in a
criminal jury trial. 32 Additionally, Kungys involved a proceeding at
which no Sixth Amendment right attached. 33 The Court concluded that
unlike Kungys, Gaudin had a constitutional right to have the jury decide
materiality because materiality was an element of the crime charged, and
23. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278.
24. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 541 n.2 (4th ed. 1873)).
25. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929).
26. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988).
31. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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the Sixth Amendment right attached to the criminal proceeding. 34
The Court’s emphasis on the interrelationship between the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments and its discussion of the characterization of the
context or purpose of the finding to be put to judge or jury is significant
when considering reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
That is because Gaudin confirmed that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
work together to address who decides the defendant’s guilt—the jury—
as well as what the jury decides—whether the government has
persuaded the jury “beyond a reasonable doubt” of the facts establishing
each element of the criminal charge. 35 This suggests that judicial acts
that have the effect of lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof on
any element of the crime charged could under some circumstances
undermine, if not violate outright, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Thus, under Gaudin, a critical issue in determining the
constitutionality of an allocation of judicial fact-finding is the way in
which one frames the context of the determination to be made. If one
characterizes a probable cause finding as a preliminary evidentiary
ruling, one result follows—the judge decides; if one characterizes it as
an element of the crime charged, then another follows—the jury decides.
Accordingly, the context of the fact-finding is an important measure of
the constitutionality of the judge–jury allocation. Thus, the context in
which reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing arises, and the
ways in which that context demonstrates that forfeiture by wrongdoing
differs from questions of evidentiary competence, are important
considerations if the integrity of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is to
be wholly preserved. 36 When context is considered, the Gaudin Court’s
example of probable cause being a judge question when used to
determine the admissibility of evidence but being a jury question when it
is an element of the crime 37 does not provide a satisfying explanation of
why the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing is
constitutionally sound. 38 Because, as discussed infra in Part V.A., the
34. Id. at 511.
35. Id. at 510–11; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993).
36. Murphy, supra note 15, at 964–65, 984–85 (arguing that in some “respects, the Supreme
Court misuses context as a substitute for sound reasoning [leading to] a usurpation of the jury’s
constitutional province” and calling for “more analysis and less unexplained reliance on context” to
“bring needed precision to the often difficult task of allocating decisionmaking between judge and
jury”).
37. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521.
38. See Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 522–23 (describing the fact-finding as an evidentiary
one when being used to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing and as substantive when being used to
determine guilt or innocence). Professor Murphy notes that judicial allocation of evidentiary issues is
based on the “intention to enhance the reliability of the factfinding process,” while judicial allocation of
pretrial issues is justified by the collateral nature of pretrial issues or the object of keeping “from the jury
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forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine does not address evidentiary
competence, the Court’s and scholars’ analogy to preliminary questions
of evidentiary admissibility has troubling implications for important
constitutional principles.
Although forfeiture by wrongdoing is a rule of equity that does not
evaluate the competence of evidence, clearly it affects the admissibility
of evidence. 39 That it does so should be troubling when the doctrine is
applied reflexively in homicide cases to admit evidence that makes a
conviction more likely. 40 The Supreme Court has long distinguished
evidence that may be admitted at a jury trial from evidence that may be
used in other proceedings, on the ground that the rules of evidence are
linked to the reasonable doubt standard, such that the prosecutor’s proof
must be made “by evidence confined to that which long experience in
the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution,
has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard.”41
The evidence rules themselves are largely exclusionary and have been
matters on which reasonable people could differ.” Murphy, supra note 15, at 976–77. These
justifications do not support judicial allocation of the decision-making when applying forfeiture by
wrongdoing reflexively in homicide cases. The doctrine’s application to hearsay objections eliminates a
screen against the admission of unreliable evidence; the required fact-findings are closely intertwined
with the jury’s purpose of determining guilt or innocence of homicide; and the object of the doctrine is
not to keep matters from the jury.
39. Application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not require any assessment of the competence
of the evidence sought to be introduced. Others have questioned whether the competence of that
evidence should be an implied requirement of the doctrine. See, e.g., Anthony Bocchino & David
Sonenshein, Rule 804(b)(6) – The Illegitimate Child of The Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule
and Confrontation Clause, 73 MO. L. REV. 41, 41 (2008).
40. This proposition would find support even were forfeiture by wrongdoing merely a
preliminary question of evidentiary admissibility. As Professor Stephen Salzburg pointed out, different
preliminary fact questions present different risks to the reliability of the verdict. Stephen A. Salzburg,
Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 275 (1975). Professor
Salzburg recognized that the closer the unity between the judicial fact-finding required for a preliminary
fact-finding and the jury’s fact-finding, the greater the risk that an error in the preliminary fact-finding
will produce an unreliable verdict. Id. at 283. However, he concluded that most preliminary factfindings were appropriately decided by the judge using the preponderance of the evidence standard, for
“few cases actually involve a coincidence between preliminary facts and ultimate issues; one must
actually strain to find such cases. Thus in the typical case we need not fear that the preliminary fact
question is the twin of the ultimate fact question.” Id. at 291–92. Reflexive application of forfeiture by
wrongdoing, if it were appropriately characterized as merely a preliminary question of evidentiary
admissibility, would be that rare case. While Professor Salzburg advocated applying a higher standard
of proof to preliminary questions of admissibility in some situations where the judge and jury were to
decide the same facts, adjusting the standard of proof to be applied to judicial fact-finding would not
completely address the question of whether a court may sanction the defendant for the conduct for which
he is brought before the jury by reducing the burden on the government. See id. at 305 (recommending
higher standard for confessions, dying declarations, and some declarations against interest).
41. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (affirming trial court’s consideration of
evidence at hearing seeking suppression of evidence seized during a search of the defendant’s vehicle)
(emphasis added).
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described by the Court as “historically grounded rights of our system,
developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with
resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.” 42 It logically follows
that the erroneous admission of outcome determinative evidence is
grounds to vacate a criminal conviction. 43 If forfeiture by wrongdoing
is more than a preliminary question of evidentiary admissibility, its
expansion of the scope of admissible evidence threatens the integrity of
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 44 Its employment in a
homicide case to admit victim hearsay evidence is intended to admit
important, likely outcome determinative evidence. 45
Applied
reflexively, forfeiture by wrongdoing intertwines the judge’s factfinding with the jury’s fact-finding. Therefore, a subsequent guilty
verdict could be used to justify even an erroneous judicial fact-finding
on one or more of the same factual elements of the crime. 46
III. FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
A. Two Objections Lost
Whether under a common law or statutory construct, forfeiture by
wrongdoing deprives the defendant of the constitutional right to confront
a witness and objections to the admission of hearsay evidence. The
doctrine thus may be applied to bar a criminal defendant from objecting
to the admission of hearsay evidence on the ground that the defendant’s
constitutional right, to confront a witness has been forfeited. However,
the doctrine may also be applied to bar any litigant—such as a civil

42. Id. at 174.
43. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
See also Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1992) (discussing instances of non-constitutional evidentiary error that led to
reversal).
44. See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Trial Judges Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge
Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2000) (discussing
early American shift away from allocating preliminary findings of fact to judges due to the risk that
judges could use such findings to dictate trial outcomes, thus undermining the jury’s power).
45. Larry King Live: Drew Peterson Arrested in Connection with Death of Third Wife (CNN
television broadcast, May 7, 2009), transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
0905/07/lkl.01.html (discussing likelihood that, if victim hearsay is admitted through forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine, jury will convict).
46. In State v. Fry, the Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view that the defendant’s conviction
of aggravated homicide for killing a witness (rendered upon evidence including statements admitted by
reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing) supported the conclusion that the trial court correctly
determined that the defendant killed the victim with the intent of preventing her from being a witness
against him. 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010).
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litigant for whom no constitutional right to confront witnesses exists—
from invoking the rule against hearsay. 47
The rule that hearsay is inadmissible and the constitutional right to
confront witnesses are related because they protect similar interests, but,
as illustrated above by the difference between civil and criminal
litigants, they are not identical or coextensive. In Crawford v.
Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars
the admission of un-confronted “testimonial” statements, such as
statements made to a police officer investigating a crime, testimony in
depositions or in court, and sworn affidavits. 48 Non-testimonial
statements, such as statements made to friends or family members or
statements made in emergency situations (such as on a 911 call),
ordinarily may be admitted without raising Confrontation Clause
concerns, although the Court left open whether the admission of nontestimonial statements could ever violate the right to confront
witnesses. 49 The right to confront witnesses thus may provide a basis
for excluding from evidence even those hearsay statements that fall
within an exception to the rule against hearsay, but only if the statement
is testimonial. Thus, under a Confrontation Clause analysis of forfeiture
by wrongdoing, the forfeiture is of the right to confront, which applies to
testimonial hearsay statements. 50
In comparison with the right to confront witnesses, objections to the
admission of hearsay evidence provide both civil and criminal litigants
with the opportunity to seek exclusion of hearsay statements that do not
fall within the jurisdiction’s recognized exceptions to the rule against
hearsay. 51
As discussed more fully in the following subpart, the doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing has evolved considerably from its common

47. See, e.g., Proffit v. State, 191 P.3d 963, 967 (Wyo. 2008). Some states have not applied
forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit statements that do not meet an exception to the rule against hearsay,
but the Federal Rules of Evidence and many state courts apply forfeiture by wrongdoing both to the
right to confront witnesses and to the defendant’s ability to assert hearsay objections. See, e.g., People
v. Hagos, No. 05CA2296, 2009 WL 3464284, at *21 (Colo. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (holding that the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine did not permit admission of evidence otherwise inadmissible under
Colorado’s evidence rules), cert. denied, No. 10SC192, 2010 WL 3529276 (Col. Sept. 13, 2010).
48. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
822 (2006).
49. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
50. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–61; Davis, 547 U.S. at 822–23. The Crawford Court cast doubt on
its prior refusal to confine the Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements, but because the statement
at issue was testimonial under any definition of the term, the Court did not reach the question of whether
a non-testimonial statement’s admission could ever violate the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541
U.S. at 60–61.
51. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 (2010).
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law roots. Modern rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6),
have expanded the common law forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to
encompass forfeiture not only of the right to confront but also of
evidentiary objections to otherwise inadmissible hearsay, making it
possible to admit hearsay statements under the doctrine without regard
for whether those statements meet an exception to the rule against
hearsay. 52 The doctrine has also been expanded to encompass the
admission of statements of victims who might have been witnesses in a
future, potential, or unrelated proceeding.
B. Evolution to an Expanded Doctrine
Modern forfeiture by wrongdoing rules are deeply rooted in the
common law. The Supreme Court has traced the doctrine’s origins trace
to Lord Morley’s Case, in which the English Court admitted a witness’s
hearsay statements where the witness was “‘detained by the means or
procurement of the prisoner.’” 53 In 1879, the United States Supreme
Court first addressed the doctrine in Reynolds v. United States. 54 The
Court upheld the trial court’s finding that a defendant in a criminal
bigamy case forfeited his right to confront his alleged second wife where
the trial court had heard evidence on the issue and concluded that the
defendant had kept her from being subpoenaed. 55 The Court announced
the principle, long applied in England, that “[t]he Constitution does not
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his
own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with
the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses
away, he cannot insist on his privilege.” 56 In Reynolds, as in the
preceding authorities supporting the doctrine, the defendant stood
accused of a crime other than the act of making the witness

52. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford, the right to confront and the right to object
to hearsay arguably were coextensive, but Crawford’s ruling that only the admission of testimonial
statements violates the Confrontation Clause made clear that although they may share the same roots,
the rule against hearsay is separate and not coextensive with the right to confront witnesses. Crawford,
541 U.S. at 50, 68. A non-testimonial statement that is not admissible under any other exception to the
rule against hearsay may be admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine if state law allows.
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008). Compare Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883,
900, 900 n.11 (Pa. 2010) (noting that under the Pennsylvania evidence rules, forfeiture by wrongdoing
extinguishes hearsay objections and the right to confront witnesses), with Hagos, 2009 WL 3464284, at
*21 (noting that in Colorado, forfeiture by wrongdoing does not extinguish hearsay objections).
53. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008) (quoting Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr.
769, 770–71 (H.L. 1666)).
54. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
55. Id. at 159–60.
56. Id. at 158.
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unavailable. 57 To determine whether the defendant had made the
witness unavailable, the trial court did not need to determine any facts
that were elements of the crime for which the defendant stood trial. The
Reynolds Court considered forfeiture to be a rule of equity that
prevented a party from gaining a tactical advantage at trial through acts
designed to thwart the prosecution’s ability to bring witnesses against
him. 58
After Reynolds, forfeiture by wrongdoing received little attention
until the early 1980s. 59 Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 60 entitled
“Forfeiture by Wrongdoing,” was approved by the Supreme Court in
1997. The Rule was drafted in response to a perception that witness
intimidation had increasingly thwarted criminal prosecutions. 61 The
Rule permits the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay
statements, including both testimonial and non-testimonial statements, if
a party has “engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to,
57. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1878) (finding evidence to support the
conclusion that defendant caused witness, his wife, to be away during bigamy trial); Williams v. State,
19 Ga. 402, 402 (1856) (affirming admission of absent witness’s “written memorandum” where
defendant, on trial for larceny, induced complaining larceny victim to stay away from trial; witness’s
prior statement was confronted so no Confrontation Clause issue was implicated); Queen v. Scaife, 117
Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (1851) (noting that there was evidence that defendant caused witness to be
unavailable at defendant’s robbery trial); Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76, 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775) (noting
that defendant caused witness to remain away from his trial for counterfeiting and other charges);
Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H.L. 1692) (noting that witness was bribed to stay away
from defendant’s trial).
58. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159 (“[I]f a witness is absent by [defendant’s] own wrongful
procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he
has kept away. The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate
consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the
witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege.
If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no
condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated.”).
59. In 1976, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals could not identify a single state or federal court
opinion directly addressing whether a defendant “waived” or forfeited the right to confront a witness
after engaging in witness intimidation that resulted in the witness being unavailable at trial. United
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976). The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing had
been applied to uphold removing a misbehaving defendant from the trial courtroom and to prevent the
defendant from claiming constitutional error when he voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom.
Illinois v Allen, 223 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1970) (removal of defendant); Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S.
17, 20 (1973) (defendant voluntarily absent); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (defendant
voluntarily absent). In 1934, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that the
criminal defendant could forfeit the right to confrontation by misconduct—a scenario not present in that
case. 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
60. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay Through Forfeiture
By Wrongdoing–Old Wine in a New Bottle–Solving the Mystery of Codification of the Concept into
Federal Rule 804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REV. 891, 903–04 (2001) (discussing motivations for the new rule,
including pressure from the Department of Justice, along with the perception that it was becoming more
difficult to prosecute federal crimes due to witness intimidation and murders).
61. Id.
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and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” 62 The
Rule was intended to deter witness “intimidation” and other conduct
designed to thwart the prosecution of crimes, a significant problem in
“organized crime and drug prosecutions.” 63
The Advisory Committee intended that courts would be the arbiters of
whether the declarant’s hearsay statement is admissible under Rule
804(b)(6) by employing Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), which
provides that the court decides questions of evidentiary admissibility. 64
As drafted, Rule 804(b)(6) addresses both hearsay statements and the
right to confront witnesses. 65 It permits admission of otherwise
inadmissible hearsay when the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant caused or acquiesced in wrongdoing intended to and having
the effect of making the declarant unavailable. 66 It does so without
regard to the nature or reliability of the declarant’s hearsay statements. 67
The Rule does not distinguish between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements and allows courts to admit hearsay to which the
Confrontation Clause does not apply. 68 Thus, the plain language of the
Rule is more expansive than the constitutional common law doctrine.
However, its breadth is not unlimited, being constrained by the high
court’s jurisprudence on the permissible scope of forfeiture of the right
to confront a witness.
A number of states have codified the common law rule in their rules
of evidence, 69 while others continue to apply the common law rule
62. Id.
63. James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for ‘Forfeiture’ by
Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1197 n.19 (2006) (citations omitted).
64. James Flanagan, Forfeiture By Wrongdoing And Those Who Acquiesce In Witness
Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp And Other Problems With Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 520–26 (2003) [hereinafter Flanagan, Reach]; FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
65. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
66. Id.
67. See Flanagan, Reach, supra note 64, at 520–26 (2003) (discussing lack of reliability
requirement).
68. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2010).
69. See, e.g., CAL. R. EVID. § 1350 (2002) (providing hearsay exception for certain types of
victim statements in serious felony cases); DEL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001) (same as federal rule); HAW.
R. EVID. 804(b)(7) (2009) (no intent required for forfeiture); KY. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (2009) (same as
federal rule); MD. R. EVID. 5-804(b)(5)(B) (2009) (limiting application of exception in criminal cases);
MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2009) (same as federal rule); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2009) (same); OHIO
R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001) (same); OR. R. EVID. 804 (3)(g) (2009) (same); PENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)
(same); TENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (1999) (same); VT R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2004) (same). Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming
do not have a rule of evidence recognizing forfeiture by wrongdoing as a hearsay exception; however,
those states may apply the common law rule. Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 79–80.
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announced in Reynolds in one form or another. 70 Only a few states
require the court to find forfeiture by wrongdoing by the clear and
convincing evidence standard, 71 with the majority permitting proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. 72 Many require a pretrial hearing before
forfeiture may be applied. 73
C. Crawford’s Promotion of Reflexive Application
Although courts rarely applied forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively
before Crawford v. Washington, 74 the Crawford Court’s re-working of
the Confrontation Clause test encouraged its use in homicide cases.
Before Crawford, if a victim’s statement fell within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception or had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
admission of that statement was not a violation of the Confrontation
Clause. 75 After Crawford, however, the hearsay inquiry no longer
resolved the Confrontation Clause inquiry; the proper inquiry became
whether an un-confronted statement was “testimonial.” 76 As a result of
Crawford’s major reassessment of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, a
victim’s testimonial statements would be inadmissible even if they fell
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or were accompanied by
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. For example, a victim’s
70. See, e.g., State v. Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 524–25 (Utah 2010) (common law doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing); State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010) (common law doctrine);
Hunt v. State, 218 P.3d 516, 519 (Okl. Crim. App. 2009) (C. Johnson, P.J., concurring) (common law
doctrine applies to Confrontation Clause, but no rule of evidence exists).
71. See, e.g., People v. McCrae, 895 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102–03 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (noting that
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was “involved” in the murder); State v.
Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 404 (Wash. 2007) (“clear, cogent, and convincing” standard).
72. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 440–41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)
(adopting preponderance standard, reasoning that wrongdoing “is invariably accompanied by tangible
evidence such as . . . the murder of a key witness, and there is hardly any reason to apply a burden of
proof which might encourage behavior which strikes at the heart of the system itself”).
73. See, e.g., People v. Hagos, No. 05CA2296, 2009 WL 3464284, at *19 (Colo. App. Oct. 29,
2009) (hearing required in Colorado), cert. denied, No. 10SC192, 2010 WL 3529276 (Col. Sept. 13,
2010); People v. Cotto, 642 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Sirois hearing in New York).
74. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding
forfeiture by wrongdoing based on defendant’s alleged killing of federal informant, for which defendant
was on trial). The Eighth Circuit found that the defendant would “benefit” from having killed the victim
to prevent her testimony in another case if forfeiture was not applied. Id. Professor Polelle points out
that the fallacy in this argument is that the victim is never a witness at a homicide trial; the benefit to the
defendant only would accrue in the trial at which the victim would have testified had she been alive.
Polelle, supra note 11, at 310 (noting “illogic[ ]” of reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing,
for “[t]he definition of criminal homicide presupposes the unavailability of the witness; therefore, one
cannot intentionally procure the unavailability of a victim whose unavailability because of death is a
necessary part of the crime”).
75. Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
76. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004).
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statement to a police officer that the defendant had threatened to kill her
might meet a number of hearsay exceptions, such as the exception for
excited utterances. Prior to Crawford, the statement may have been
admissible; however, after Crawford, if the statement were deemed
testimonial, then it would have been excluded as violating the
defendant’s right to confront witnesses.
Crawford has been found to have had a profound effect on domestic
violence prosecutions, including homicide cases related to domestic
violence, because the admission of statements within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception or made under circumstances that supported their
reliability was now foreclosed as a violation of the defendant’s rights
under the Confrontation Clause. 77 The use of forfeiture by wrongdoing
in homicide cases is now commonly invoked as a legitimate means of
avoiding Crawford’s ill-effects on domestic violence prosecutions. 78
However, Crawford also affected the prosecutions of other homicides,
such as those in which the victim lived long enough to speak to

77. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005) [hereinafter
Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers] (presenting data reflecting dramatic detrimental effect of Crawford and
recommending, among other needed reforms, that “[a]ll states should codify the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing,” which should be construed to allow admission of even victim hearsay statements that do
not fall within a recognized hearsay exception). See also Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a “Get Out of
Jail Free” Card for Batterers and Abusers? An Argument for a Narrow Definition of “Testimonial,” 84
OR. L. REV. 1093 (2005). The amicus brief of the Battered Women’s Justice Project and Other
Domestic Violence Organizations in Giles further highlights the problem:
The realities of battering and domestic violence homicides have forced prosecutors to
be resourceful in identifying and obtaining a variety of evidence to prove the guilt of a
murderer. Recognizing the unique characteristics presented by domestic violence
homicides, prosecutors have developed “evidence-based” prosecution. Evidence-based
prosecution emphasizes the gathering of reliable evidence, such as 911 tapes,
photographs, medical records, admissions by a defendant, statements of relatives or
neighbors, and police observations, in order to build a case that does not depend upon the
participation of the victim. Utilizing long-accepted exceptions for excited utterances,
medical treatment statements, and present sense impressions, prosecutors attempt to hold
batterers accountable for their criminal conduct, even in the absence of the victim.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Battered Women’s Justice Project and Other Domestic Violence
Organizations in Support of Respondent at 11–12, Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (No. 076053).
78. To a large extent, Professor Friedman recommended this approach long before Crawford,
when he wrote:
Under the approach I suggest, the fact that a statement fits within an exception to the
rule against hearsay would not take the statement over the confrontation barrier. Thus,
the traditional exception for dying declarations would not defeat a confrontation claim.
But notice how sensible application of the forfeiture principle takes up the slack left by
the absence of the dying declaration exception—reaching the same result in most cases,
but not in all, and operating on a far more justifiable basis.
Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 526.
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investigating police officers but died before the perpetrator was tried. 79
Before Crawford, few courts had considered the reflexive application
of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 80 The majority of courts that had
considered whether to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively
favored application of the rule. 81 The rationale for applying the rule in
this way was that having killed the victim, the defendant would benefit
in his homicide trial if permitted to object to the admission of the
victim’s hearsay statements. 82
For example, in United States v. Natson, 83 where the district court
could
discern no reason that a homicide victim’s statements should not be
admissible if the party against whom the statements are to be used
committed the homicide, at least in part, to prevent the victim’s
testimony. It would be folly to exclude such evidence, and yet admit into
evidence in a homicide case hearsay statements of a witness (not the
victim of the underlying crime) who the defendant threatened and scared
into leaving the country. 84

However, the court declined to rule on the admissibility of the
statements, finding that a hearing was necessary to establish that the
defendant had intended to make the victim unavailable as a witness.85
The flaw in this logic is that there is a significant difference between a
criminal defendant, who seeks to thwart the progress of the trial by
keeping witnesses from coming to that trial, and the criminal defendant
79. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 116–17, 124–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(finding forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine appropriate where shooting victim described shooter to
police officer responders and later died from wounds, on ground that defendant intended to “silence”
victims).
80. Flanagan, Reach, supra note 64, at 544 (pointing out that in the twenty-five years before
2003, forfeiture by wrongdoing was only invoked in approximately seventy-five cases); United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding no state or federal case directly applying
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in instance of witness intimidation).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005) (but whether defendant
killed victim not in dispute); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Cubie, No. 05-CR-146, 2007 WL 3223299 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007); United States v. Natson, 469 F.
Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Ga. 2006); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State
v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App. 2004); People v.
Moore, 117 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007).
82. As others have noted, this rationale is not logical because the victim is never available to
testify at the homicide trial. Polelle, supra note 11, at 310.
83. 469 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
84. Id. at 1250–51.
85. Id. at 1252. The court noted that the rule “is not designed to provide an additional sanction
for the homicide of someone who may have been a witness had they not been killed” and that to satisfy
the exception’s purpose of denying the defendant the benefit of “intentionally eliminating a witness” and
“to deter parties from seeking to eliminate witnesses . . . there must be some connection between the
party’s motive and his elimination of the witness.” Id.
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being tried for killing an individual, whatever the motive. 86
In State v. Jensen, 87 a highly-publicized 88 homicide case in which
defendant stood trial for murdering his wife with antifreeze, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin likewise upheld the application of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to admit the deceased wife’s hearsay
statements. 89 A letter from Jensen’s wife to detectives stating that the
defendant was her probable killer in the event of her early demise was
held to be testimonial. 90 The court adopted a broad construction of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, holding that intent to make the victim
unavailable as a witness was not a necessary component of the doctrine,
and remanded the case for a determination of whether Jensen “caused
[his wife’s] unavailability, thereby forfeiting his right to
confrontation.” 91 In its analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
swayed by the reasoning of Professor Friedman and numerous courts
that the defendant’s motive was irrelevant to whether the defendant
would “benefit through his own wrongdoing if such a witness’s
statements could not be used against him.” 92
But, not all courts accepted the proposition that the alleged homicide
to prevent a witness from testifying in a proceeding should give rise to
an adverse evidentiary ruling in a subsequent criminal prosecution for
the alleged homicide. Those that rejected the reflexive application of

86. In the wake of Crawford, forfeiture by wrongdoing also has been expanded to what this
Article calls the hybrid case in which the defendant allegedly killed the victim during the commission of
a crime, such as robbery, ostensibly so that there would be no witnesses to that crime. See e.g.,
Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (It is “logical [to infer that] appellant
killed the Herreras because he wanted to steal their truck and their money, and he didn’t want any
witnesses to his crime—especially witnesses that knew him, and knew where to find him.”).
87. 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007).
88. The trial, including the victim’s letter to detectives that was ultimately admitted under the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, received national news coverage. See, e.g., ABC Primetime Live
(ABC television broadcast July 3, 2008), transcript available at 2008 WLNR 12479020 (Westlaw);
Carrie Antlfinger, Wife: I ‘Fear For My Early Demise’; Defense: Letter Was an Attempt to Frame, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 8, 2008, at 4; ABC 20/20 (ABC television broadcast Mar. 1, 2008), transcript available at
2008 WLNR 4218022 (Westlaw). During the 20/20 interview, Special Prosecutor Robert Jambois
stated that prosecuting the case would be “very difficult without the letter coming in.” Id.
89. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 535.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 521. On remand, the trial court found that the defendant had caused the witness to be
unavailable and admitted the letter at trial. Carrie Antlfinger, Jensen Convicted of Murder, WIS. ST. J.,
Feb. 22, 2008 (First ed.), at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 3566541 (Westlaw). The defendant may
receive a new trial as a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Giles, which held that intent to
make the victim unavailable as a witness must be found before the right to confront is deemed forfeited.
Tom Kertschner, Mark Jensen May Get New Trial in Wife’s Poisoning: U.S. Supreme Court Ruling May
Bar Letter From Wife, THE MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 26, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
11972694 (Westlaw).
92. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 534.
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forfeiture by wrongdoing in homicide cases expressed concern about
undermining the defendant’s right to trial by jury—a subject given little,
if any, insightful discussion in the majority of cases applying forfeiture
by wrongdoing to victim hearsay in homicide cases.
In United States v. Lentz, 93 Judge Lee of the Eastern District of
Virginia refused to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) to admit
the hearsay statements of the victim at her spouse’s murder trial even
though the victim would have been a witness against her husband in an
unrelated divorce proceeding. 94
Notwithstanding the Rule’s
requirement that the defendant must have intended to prevent the victim
from being a witness, the district court expressed concern that
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit “the testimony of a
decedent victim for whose death a defendant is on trial” would trample
the presumption of innocence and the defendant’s right to a jury trial. 95
The court also noted the factual impossibility of finding the victim to be
a witness within the meaning of Rule 804(b)(6), stating:
[T]he divorce proceeding [in which the victim was expected to be a
witness] is not the proceeding that will be before this Court. Defendant is
on trial for the kidnaping [sic] and murder of Doris Lentz. Ms. Lentz
would not be testifying in this case if she were available because
Defendant could not have been charged with such offense. Therefore,
statements made by Ms. Lentz to others are inadmissible under the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule. 96

Several other courts have declined to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing
reflexively where the defendant disputed having killed the victim 97 or
where there was no evidence that the homicide was motivated by the
desire to prevent the victim from testifying. 98 Those courts cited similar
93. 282 F. Supp. 2d 399 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by 383
F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2004).
94. Id. at 426.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 426–27.
97. People v. Gilmore, No. 258334, 2006 WL 744268, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2006)
(“[T]o allow in the statement where the defendant denies doing the killing can only be done if the Court
is willing to ignore the presumption of innocence and invade the province of the jury and make a
preliminary finding of guilt. This we are unwilling to do. We are not willing to determine whether a
defendant is entitled to a right guaranteed him by the Constitution based upon the trial judge’s
determination of a contested factual issue at trial.”).
98. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, No. Crim. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 3,
2005) (declining to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively where there was no evidence that victim
would have been a witness, but stating that the reflexive case where the victim would have been a
witness to an unrelated proceeding is “archetypical”); State v. Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 412 (Wash. 2007)
(Sanders, J., dissenting) (stating that application of reflexive forfeiture by wrongdoing violated
defendant’s presumption of innocence and invaded province of jury by “forcing the judge to decide
Mason’s guilt prior to his trial”); People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that
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concerns about the right to trial by jury. 99 One state, Ohio, has enacted a
rule of evidence that bars the reflexive application of forfeiture by
wrongdoing to admit homicide victim hearsay statements in the
prosecution of that homicide. 100
IV. GILES V. CALIFORNIA
Giles presented the question of whether a criminal defendant forfeited
the right to confront a witness when there was no evidence that the
defendant acted with the intention of preventing the declarant from
testifying. 101 The defendant, Dwayne Giles, stood trial for murdering
his girlfriend, Brenda Avie. At trial, the government offered statements
that Avie made to a police officer responding to a domestic violence
incident. 102 The statements were admitted under a state rule of evidence
rule that permitted the admission of an unavailable declarant’s
statements describing the “infliction or threat of physical injury on a
declarant . . . [if the] statements are deemed trustworthy.” 103 After
Giles’s conviction and during the pendency of his appeal, the Supreme
Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 104 which required exclusion of
testimonial statements such as Avie’s unless the defendant had already
had an opportunity to confront the witness. 105 The California Court of
Appeal then held that admission of the victim’s hearsay statements at
Giles’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause because Crawford
recognized a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and Giles had
forfeited his right to confront Avie by murdering her, thereby making
her unavailable to testify. 106 The California Supreme Court affirmed. 107
forfeiture by wrongdoing rule was inapplicable where there was no evidence that defendant intended to
make the victim unavailable as a witness and the rule was “invoked against a defendant in the very trial
in which the charge is murder of the unavailable witness”).
99. Jordan, 2005 WL 513501, at *6; Mason, 162 P.3d at 412; Maher, 89 N.Y.2d at 462.
100. OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001); OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(6), 2001 STAFF NOTES (2001)
(“[T]he rule does not apply to statements of the victim in a homicide prosecution concerning the
homicide . . . .”); State v. McCarley, No. 23607, 2008 WL 375842, at *3 (Ohio App. Feb. 13, 2008)
(finding trial court’s admission of numerous victim hearsay statements to be error, but harmless, noting,
“[i]t would be a very strange case indeed if a person murdered another for the purpose of preventing the
other from testifying in their own murder trial”).
101. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 354 (2008).
102. Id. at 354–55. The statements met the requirements of a California exception to the hearsay
rule but implicated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because they fit Crawford’s definition
of testimonial statements.
103. Id. at 2682 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1370 (West Supp. 2008)).
104. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
105. Id. at 61.
106. California v. Giles, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
107. People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 435 (Cal. 2008).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the
judgment, finding that more was required for forfeiture of the right to
confront than a judicial finding that Giles intentionally killed the
victim. 108 In a plurality opinion, 109 Justice Scalia wrote that forfeiture
by wrongdoing could be applied in a case such as Giles if the trial court
found that: (1) the defendant killed the victim and (2) at least one
purpose for the killing was an intent to make the victim unavailable as a
witness. 110 Justice Breyer’s dissent, which was joined by Justice
Stevens and Justice Kennedy, would have applied the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine more expansively, without requiring any proof of
the defendant’s purpose. 111
Justice Scalia discussed the original purposes of forfeiture by
wrongdoing: to remedy conduct that interfered with the ability to try a
case and deter others from engaging in similar conduct. 112 The Court
acknowledged the potential intersection between the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine and the right to a fair trial:
[t]he boundaries of the doctrine seem to us intelligently fixed so as to
avoid a principle repugnant to our constitutional system of trial by jury:
that those murder defendants whom the judge considers guilty (after less
than a full trial, mind you, and of course before the jury has pronounced
guilt) should be deprived of fair-trial rights, lest they benefit from their
judge-determined wrong. 113

In concluding that “purpose” or “intent” was required for the
forfeiture of one’s right to confront witnesses, the Court further noted
that “a legislature may not ‘punish’ a defendant for his evil acts by
stripping him of the right to have his guilt in a criminal proceeding

108. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 377 (2008).
109. Justice Scalia authored the main opinion except for section II-D-2, which took issue with any
version of forfeiture by wrongdoing that did not have a purpose requirement due to the risk of abridging
the right to trial by jury. Id. at 373–74. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas filed
separate opinions concurring with Justice Scalia’s opinion in full. Justice Souter filed a separate opinion
concurring in part (except to Part II-D-2), in which Justice Ginsberg joined, id. at 379–80; and Justice
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens and Kennedy joined, id. at 380–406.
110. Id. at 377.
111. Id. at 387–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding the Court’s lack of unity on whether
knowledge-based intent was sufficient to invoke forfeiture by wrongdoing, it appears that the majority
of the Justices would permit purpose to be inferred in domestic violence cases. Id. at 375–76, 380
(Souter, J., and Ginsberg, J., concurring in part); id. at 384–85 (Breyer, J., Stevens, J., and Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Ross, supra note 2, at 39.
112. “The common-law forfeiture rule was aimed at removing the otherwise powerful incentive
for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill the witnesses against them—in other words, it is grounded in
‘the ability of courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.’” Id. at 373 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006)).
113. Id.
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determined by a jury, and on the basis of evidence the Constitution
deems reliable and admissible.” 114 Thus, although its holding focused
on the right to confront witnesses, the Court implicitly recognized that
forfeiture by wrongdoing also implicates the right to trial by jury. The
plurality’s addition of the “purpose” requirement was an attempt to save
the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine from violating both the
Confrontation Clause and the right to trial by jury.
However, the rationale for the reflexive use of forfeiture by
wrongdoing—that it is an “exception to ordinary practice” that is
“needed to protect the integrity of court proceedings,” “based upon
longstanding precedent,” and “much less expansive than the exception
proposed by the dissent”—is unpersuasive. 115 The Court transformed
the traditional intent requirement of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which
was that the defendant acted with a purpose of preventing a witness from
coming to court, to a motive for the homicide for which he is being
prosecuted. 116 In other words, if a defendant is on trial for homicide and
a motive for the homicide was to prevent the victim from testifying in
some proceeding, intent can be found even if the defendant did not seek
to hinder or prevent the homicide case from proceeding against him. By
treating forfeiture by wrongdoing as a “preliminary evidentiary ruling,”
the plurality sanctioned the very circularity that it claimed the forfeiture
by wrongdoing rule was “intelligently fixed” to avoid:

114. Id. at 374. Although inviting states to apply forfeiture by wrongdoing expansively to nontestimonial statements, the Court left open the question of whether admitting unreliable hearsay through
the doctrine could violate due process. See id. at 376. See also Tim Donaldson, Combating
Victim/Witness Intimidation in Family Violence Cases: A Response to Critics of the “Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing”, Confrontation Exception Resurrected by the Supreme Court in Crawford and Davis, 44
Id. L. Rev. 643, 693–94 (2008) (discussing scholars’ concerns about the absence of a reliability
requirement in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6)).
115. Giles, 554 U.S. at 373. Of note, however, neither of the first two justifications for the rule
comport with the Court’s recitation of the purpose and history of the rule. First, when the defendant
stands trial for homicide, the fact that he or she has killed the victim, if true, has no impact on the ability
of the court to maintain the integrity of the trial process in that proceeding. Once the defendant is
brought before the court and jury for the killing, the reason for the killing is irrelevant to the ability of
the trial court to conduct the proceedings. In contrast, when a defendant standing trial for a crime
prevents a witness from coming to court, the defendant has interfered with the court’s ability to conduct
the trial. Second, the longstanding precedent cited by the Court reveals that historically, the rule was not
used to admit victim statements in homicide trials, but was used when the defendant, on trial for one
crime, committed a different crime or wrongful act in order to prevent or dissuade a witness from
appearing at the trial. Id. at 359.
116. The purpose requirement has been interpreted by lower courts to include the defendant’s
desire to keep the victim from testifying against someone other than the defendant in some other
proceeding. See, e.g., Dednam v. Norris, No. 5:06CV00076 WRW/BD, 2008 WL 4006997 (E.D. Ark.
Aug. 25, 2008) (applying forfeiture by wrongdoing rule where defendant stood trial for murdering
victim, and the court found that defendant committed the murder in order to prevent victim from
testifying against defendant’s relative in unrelated armed robbery trial).
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We do not say, of course, that a judge can never be allowed to inquire
into guilt of the charged offense in order to make a preliminary
evidentiary ruling. That must sometimes be done under the forfeiture rule
that we adopt—when, for example, the defendant is on trial for murdering
a witness in order to prevent his testimony. 117

The plurality must have been aware that adding a purpose element to
the required judicial fact-finding did not adequately address the
conundrum of reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
Indeed, Justice Breyer’s dissent 118 argued that adding a “purpose”
requirement was unnecessary, in part because “any forfeiture rule
requires a judge to determine as a preliminary matter that the
defendant’s own wrongdoing caused the witness to be absent.” 119
The plurality’s intent requirement does not reach non-testimonial
victim hearsay, which might be admitted solely based upon a judicial
finding of guilt before the jury has ever reached a verdict. 120 Because
Crawford and Giles held that the Sixth Amendment right to confront
reaches only testimonial statements, courts remain free to apply
forfeiture by wrongdoing to find that a homicide defendant has forfeited
his right to object to any non-testimonial hearsay evidence. 121 Thus,
“[s]tatements to friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and
statements to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be
excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules,” and as to such non-testimonial
hearsay, states “are free to adopt the dissent’s version of forfeiture by
wrongdoing.” 122 Giles thus supports the following legal propositions:
(1) if a statement is testimonial, then a court may find that the defendant
has forfeited his right to object under the Confrontation Clause if the
court determines that the defendant committed the killing and that one
purpose for the killing was to silence the victim as a potential witness;
and (2) if a statement is non-testimonial hearsay, a state court may find
that the defendant forfeited any hearsay objection if the court determines
that the defendant committed the killing. 123 The Court suggested that

117. Giles, 554 U.S. at 374 n.6.
118. Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy. Id. at 380 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
119. Id. at 403.
120. Id. at 376–77 (plurality opinion).
121. In State v. Fallentine, 215 P.3d 945, 947 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), the Washington Court of
Appeals discussed the state’s expansive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to non-testimonial
statements and the more restrictive requirements imposed by Giles on testimonial statements.
122. Giles, 554 U.S. at 376.
123. Federal courts are constrained by the plain language of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6),
which requires a finding that the defendant procured the unavailability of the witness with the intention
of preventing the witness from testifying.
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states may admit non-testimonial statements through reflexive
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing without regard to the
unreliability of those statements. 124
The Giles decision has been attacked on one hand as a boon to
batterers 125 and hailed on the other as leaving “plenty . . . to boost the
hopes among prosecutors and domestic violence advocates about the
way the decision will be applied in future cases.” 126 In the aftermath of
Giles, some state courts have been receptive toward an expanded
homicide exception to the rule against hearsay. 127 Others have
permitted “intent” to be inferred from evidence of a pattern of domestic
violence that culminated in the murder or from the fact that the
defendant had been charged with domestic violence before the murder
occurred. 128

124. The federal rule contains an express intent requirement. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
Application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit otherwise inadmissible, nontestimonial statements
does not follow from the doctrine’s roots as a means of preventing misuse of the right to confront.
Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 61 (“To the extent that the common law Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing hearsay exception and its codified exception in Rule 804(b)(6) are rationalized as merely
an analogue to the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine excusing Confrontation, such analogy is
misplaced. Given the differences between the functions of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rule, and the fact that the Confrontation Clause no longer applies to ‘non-testimonial’ hearsay, it makes
little sense to argue that forfeiture of the Constitutional right to confront a witness by the criminal
defendant through cross-examination somehow requires equivalent forfeiture of the reliability and
trustworthiness requirements of an hearsay exception regarding non-testimonial hearsay.”).
125. Lininger, The Sound of Silence, supra note 5, at 862.
126. Ross, supra note 2, at 34.
127. Roberts v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1018, 1025–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a party who
has rendered a witness unavailable for cross-examination through a criminal act, including homicide,
may not object to the admission of non-testimonial hearsay as inadmissible under the Indiana Rules of
Evidence, but leaving for “another day” proof of wrongdoing required when defendant disputes killing
victim); Proffit v. State, 191 P.3d 963, 967 (Wyo. 2008) (noting that defendant tried for conspiracy to
commit murder of sexual assault victim having affirmed based on Giles that defendant forfeited
Confrontation Clause right, Wyoming Supreme Court considered “whether, given application of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, it was also necessary for the State to satisfy a hearsay exception to
have B.C.’s statement admitted” and concluded, “We think not”).
128. See, e.g., State v. MacLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 272–73 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (noting that
victim’s hearsay statements that since their breakup, defendant had stalked her, made threats, and was
abusive, coupled with charge that defendant had burglarized victim’s home, provided sufficient grounds
to support trial court finding that defendant intended to make the victim unavailable as a witness);
People v. Banos, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476, 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding it “reasonable” to infer intent
from: (1) 911 call victim had made ten months before murder, during which defendant asked whether
victim wanted “to speak to the police” and repeatedly asked victim whether she was going to talk, and
(2) multiple later violations of a restraining order).
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V. JUDICIAL FACT-FINDING FOR FORFEITURE IN HOMICIDE CASES:
UNDERMINING JURIES?
Application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in homicide
cases to admit the homicide victim’s hearsay against the defendant
affects the jury verdict by altering the standard of proof. It does this by
admitting evidence that would not be admissible if the court did not first
determine, at a minimum, that the defendant is guilty as charged.
Gaudin suggests that the context in which one considers the judge–jury
allocation is important and that preliminary evidentiary admissibility are
appropriately allocated to the courts. However, if forfeiture by
wrongdoing is not properly characterized as merely a preliminary
question of evidentiary admissibility, but is more properly considered to
be a sanction, then the constitutional soundness of allocating the
required fact-finding to the court has received insufficient consideration
and is not adequately supported by Giles.
A. Not a Question of Evidentiary Admissibility
When considering whether the judge/jury fact-finding allocation
passes constitutional muster, Justice Scalia, in Gaudin, distinguished
preliminary questions of evidentiary admissibility from elements of the
criminal offense for purposes of constitutional analysis. 129 Thus, “every
essential ingredient of the crime must be proven to the satisfaction of the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 130 The Court recognized that juries act
as more than “mere factfinder[s].” 131 Accordingly, devices, such as
statutory inferences and presumptions, do not pass constitutional muster
if they “‘undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial.’” 132
Thus, if reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing is viewed
as a preliminary evidentiary ruling, allocation of the fact-finding to the
judge appears to comport with the holding in Gaudin because the
judge’s finding that the defendant killed the victim looks akin to a
judge’s determination of probable cause in the context of a suppression
hearing. But, if the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing is
considered as a sanction designed to deter and punish conduct that is
inimical to the judicial system, it seems reasonable to ask whether that
sanction operates as a device that undermines the defendant’s
129. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 520–21 (1995).
130. Id. at 519 (quoting Brief for Appellant in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 26, 277 (1929),
O.T. 1928, No. 555, at p. 109, (argument for appellant)).
131. Id. at 514.
132. Id. at 514–15 (quoting Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979)).
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constitutional right to have a jury determine every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Long before Giles was decided, Professor Friedman argued that
because the reflexive application of the doctrine invoked a preliminary
question of evidentiary admissibility, the identity between the factual
evidentiary predicate to be decided by the judge and the factual elements
of the crime of homicide should not be troubling. 133 This reasoning has
been adopted by subsequent court decisions as a justification for the
reflexive application of the doctrine. 134 When deciding preliminary
questions of evidentiary admissibility, courts are engaging in factfinding for a different purpose than juries, and courts adhere to a
different standard of proof. 135 Application of the forfeiture rule in
homicide cases is thus said to be analogous to the admissibility
determination of a court when deciding whether to admit the statements
of a coconspirator under the coconspirator admission exception to the
rule against hearsay. 136 It also has been said that there is no risk that the
jury will be infected by the judge’s fact-finding because the judge is not
announcing to the jury that he made such a fact-finding, so the jury is
still free to reach its own conclusion about the defendant’s guilt or
innocence. 137 None of these justifications for the reflexive application
of the doctrine supports the conclusion that doing so does not undermine
the defendant’s right to have the jury determine every element of the
crime charged by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
First, that a judge decides facts for the purpose of sanctioning the
defendant with the admission of evidence, while the jury decides facts
for the purpose of rendering a verdict, does not ensure that reflexive
forfeiture by wrongdoing is constitutionally sound. As Justice Scalia
pointedly noted in Gaudin, context is an important consideration. The
context of judge/jury fact allocations led the Court to declare sentencing
schemes to be a violation of the right to trial by jury when the judge
decided facts for purposes of sentencing a defendant to a term of
133. Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 522.
134. United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State v. Jensen, 727
N.W.2d 518, 533–34 (Wis. 2007); People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *11 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 2, 2004).
135. Richard D. Friedman, Am. Bar. Assoc., Does an Accused Forfeit the Confrontation Right by
Murdering a Witness, Absent a Purpose to Render Her Unavailable?, 35 PREVIEW OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT CASES 364 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/
ABA_Preview7_2008.pdf.
136. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 968; Jensen, 727 N.W.2d at 535–36.
137. Friedman, Chutzpa, supra note 2, at 523; Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (noting that
“jury’s ignorance of the court’s threshold evidentiary determination” supports the court’s application of
forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit murder victim’s statements against defendant alleged to have
committed murder).
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confinement outside the statutory maximum—a purpose that is different
from the jury’s function. 138 In United States v. Booker, 139 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey 140 that
Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a
plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 141

Difference of purpose then cannot be an entirely satisfactory ground for
finding that the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does
not undermine the right to trial by jury. Had it been, the Supreme Court
would have had ample ground to uphold the power of the courts to
decide facts for the purpose of sentencing defendants. 142 The context of
the fact allocation, therefore, seems to be an important consideration
when evaluating its constitutionality.
The context in which forfeiture by wrongdoing is applied suggests
that comparisons with questions of evidentiary admissibility are
misplaced when assessing the extent to which the judge/jury allocation
undermines constitutional principles. The required fact-findings for
forfeiture by wrongdoing are unlike any hearsay exception. All hearsay
exceptions focus on the nature and circumstances under which the
statements were made, as a proxy for reliability or trustworthiness. 143
Even the coconspirator admission exception to the hearsay rule, 144
which is frequently cited to support the proposition that reflexive
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not create constitutional
138. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
139. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
140. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
141. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466).
142. Murphy, supra note 15, at 981–82 (forecasting Apprendi and Booker by arguing that Sixth
Amendment should not be susceptible to manipulation through legislatively converting elements of
offense into sentencing factors).
143. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (dying declarations); 804(b)(3) (statement against interest);
804(b)(4) (statement of personal or family history); 803(2) (excited utterance); 803(4) (statements for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment); 803(3) (then-existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition). See also Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 51 (“Unlike all other hearsay exceptions,
the Forfeiture by Wrongdoing exception is not based on trustworthiness, but rather a combination of
deterrence, punishment and equity, and is more fairly described as a sanction for such conduct. Unlike
the other Rule 804(b) exceptions to the hearsay rule, there are no requirements in Rule 804(b)(6) for
circumstantial indicia of reliability for the statements involved.”); Murphy, supra note 15, at 976–77
(noting that allocation of evidentiary or pretrial matters to judges finds support in the purposes of
enhancing the reliability of evidence or shielding the fact-finder from evidence that is unconstitutionally
obtained).
144. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (1997). Strictly speaking, coconspirator admissions are exempt
from the definition of hearsay altogether but are commonly referred to as an exception to the hearsay
rule.
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concerns, 145 rests on the competence of the evidence sought to be
admitted: Was the statement made by a coconspirator during the course
of and in furtherance of a conspiracy? 146 Moreover, in contrast to the
rationale underlying forfeiture by wrongdoing, judicial allocation of the
coconspirator exception protects the potentially innocent defendant from
the jury’s unnecessary exposure to highly prejudicial evidence, making
it a less than apt comparison. 147 Forfeiture by wrongdoing differs from
coconspirator admissions on both of these counts. The judicial factfinding operates to prejudice the defendant, not protect him. And, more
importantly, the doctrine’s application does not turn on preliminary
questions of evidentiary admissibility—such as whether a confession is
inadmissible because it was coerced; 148 whether a statement qualifies as
145. See, e.g., United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 (S.D.
Ohio 2005); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 173 (Mass. 2005) (“functionally equivalent”);
People v. Baca, No. E032929, 2004 WL 2750083, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (“[T]he
procedures for addressing forfeiture by wrongdoing were drawn from the coconspirator hearsay
exception . . . .”).
146. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides, in relevant part, that a statement is not hearsay if it is
offered against a party and is:
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient
to establish . . . the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the
declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered . . . .
See also Bourjailly v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); Christopher B. Mueller, The Federal
Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 387–88 (1984).
Although the judge decides the same factual predicate when it determines whether a statement meets the
coconspirator exception, the judge is engaging in an evidentiary competence analysis. Of course, as
with reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing, it is troubling that the judge’s fact-finding
controls the jury’s fact-finding on the same question. Id. But the fact-finding being made is
contextually quite different and the reason for its allocation to the court is theoretically to benefit the
defendant, which is quite unlike the reason for judicial allocation of the factual predicate for forfeiture
by wrongdoing. See infra note 147.
147. David E. Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: A Few Surprises, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV.
453, 457 (1984); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27
STAN. L. REV. 271, 283 n.38 (1975) (“[T]he judge is making the preliminary determination for a reason,
and often the reason is to protect the jury from evidence likely to be misused. The defendant’s
protection in such cases rests with the judge. Even where the rationale for the rule of competency is not
at all related to enhancing the reliability of the jury verdict, once it is recognized that a preliminary fact
question is also an element of a criminal charge, it is difficult to argue that a conviction should stand
where a trained judge finds a reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime.”). The congruency of the
judicial fact-finding with the jury fact-finding that can arise under the coconspirator exception provoked
considerable unease in the courts before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bourjailly, with six circuit
courts taking the view that the fact-finding must be allocated to the jury. United States v. Honneus, 508
F.2d 566, 577 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Appolo, 476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Santos, 385 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Sanders, 463 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pennett, 496 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1974).
148. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1991) (applying harmless error
standard to coerced confession).
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a dying declaration, 149 excited utterance, 150 or record of regularly
conducted activity; 151 whether evidence is inadmissible because seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 152 and whether evidence is
relevant 153 or if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice—which all focus on the competence of
evidence. 154 Instead, forfeiture by wrongdoing is concerned with
punishing and discouraging egregious conduct.
Numerous authorities agree that forfeiture by wrongdoing is
appropriately characterized as a sanction for wrongful conduct derived
from equitable principles. 155 In its ordinary application (i.e., when it is
not applied reflexively), the sanction is considered necessary to partially
remedy the harm caused to the state’s ability to prosecute the case. 156
The alleged wrongful conduct—i.e., making a witness unavailable at
trial—is penalized by the loss of hearsay and confrontation right
objections to the admission of evidence. But, it could just as easily be
any other penalty that accomplished the desired remedial and
149. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
150. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
151. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
152. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible in state courts).
153. FED. R. EVID. 402.
154. FED. R. EVID. 403.
155. Joan Comparet-Cassani, Crawford and the Forfeiture By Wrongdoing Doctrine, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 118, 1212 (2005) (noting that forfeiture by wrongdoing is an “equitable punishment”);
Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 51 (stating that forfeiture is grounded in “a combination of
deterrence, punishment and equity, and is more fairly described as a sanction”); Lininger, The Sound of
Silence, supra note 5, at 896 (describing forfeiture by wrongdoing as “[t]he sanction for witness
tampering”); Ralph Ruebner & Eugene Goryunov, Giles v. California: Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Right, Forfeiture By Wrongdoing, and A Misguided Departure From The Common Law and The
Constitution, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 577, 586–88 (2009) (refuting arguments that forfeiture by wrongdoing
is a “waiver” rather than a true “forfeiture” and stating that “forfeiting of confrontation rights is the price
that the accused pays as a penalty for having caused the unavailability of the out-of-court declarant’s
live testimony through his or her wrongful conduct”) (emphasis added); People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d
817, 821 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that rather than being a waiver, the doctrine is “more realistically
described as a forfeiture dictated by sound public policy”). But see James F. Flanagan, Foreshadowing
The Future of Forefeiture/Estoppel By Wrongdoing: Davis v. Washington and The Necessity of The
Defendant’s Intent to Intimidate The Witness, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 863, 867–68 (2007) (describing rule as
an “estoppels” to avoid “label” that implies “automatic and unintentional loss of the right to
confrontation” or assumes the conclusion that defendant waives the right to confront through “actions
against the witness”). In the author’s view, the rule operates as a forfeiture rather than a waiver, in that
the defendant has not acquiesced in the loss of his rights or voluntarily relinquished them. See Flanagan,
Reach, supra note 64, at 473–74 (citing Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (1977))
(arguing that defendant has not voluntarily relinquished rights and that the rule “occurs by operation of
law, regardless of the state of mind of the defendant,” thus making forfeiture a more appropriate
rationale).
156. Flanagan, Reach, supra note 64, at 474–75.
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prophylactic goals. 157
Thus, in Illinois v. Allen, the Court observed that a defendant could be
stripped of his Confrontation Clause right to remain in the courtroom
and personally confront the witnesses against him as a penalty for
behavior that was so disruptive as to obstruct trial proceedings. 158
Similarly, the California Court of Appeal in People v. Pearson, applied
forfeiture by wrongdoing to a defendant’s claim of double jeopardy. 159
In Pearson, the defendant was tried for assault with special
circumstances (using a deadly weapon), stalking, and threatening the
victim, but because the victim refused to appear to testify on behalf of
the prosecution, the stalking and threatening counts were dismissed.160
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel advised the court that the defendant
had been in touch with the victim, who wished to appear to testify on the
defendant’s behalf on the other charges. 161 The trial court reinstated the
dismissed counts and permitted the prosecution to reopen its case. 162
After the victim testified, the defendant was found guilty of assault, but
was acquitted of stalking and making criminal threats. 163
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by
reinstating the stalking and criminal threat counts of the indictment on
the ground that it constituted double jeopardy. 164 The California Court
of Appeal held that
a defendant is estopped from seeking refuge under the jeopardy umbrella
where he has procured an 1118.1 [the relevant California code making the
dismissal of charges final] judgment by designed wrongdoing. Even from
the cold record it is apparent that appellant prevented or dissuaded a
witness . . . and/or conspired with [the victim] to obstruct justice. 165

In reaching that holding, the court cited Reynolds 166 and Giles 167 to
support the conclusion that “there is no logical reason why the forfeiture
concept should not be applicable here. The presenting situation . . . is
equally, if not more, egregious and cries out for an estoppel.” 168 The
157. James F. Flanagan, In Defense of Giles – A Response to Professor Lininger, 87 TEX. L. REV.
67, 72 (2009).
158. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1970).
159. 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 238–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
160. Id. at 237.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 239.
166. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–61 (1878).
167. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
168. Pearson, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 239.
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court relied on the doctrine’s purpose of—“removing the otherwise
powerful incentive for defendants to intimidate, bribe, and kill witnesses
against them—in other words, it is grounded in ‘the ability of courts to
protect the integrity of their proceedings’” 169 —to support reinstatement
of the dismissed counts under the unusual factual circumstances.
The context of forfeiture by wrongdoing thus suggests that it is more
closely analogous to discovery sanctions than to preliminary questions
of evidentiary admissibility. A duty to preserve evidence arises when a
party reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to
probable or anticipated litigation, even before a lawsuit arises. 170
Failure to observe that duty to preserve may properly be viewed as an
interference with the conduct of trial, and the judge may appropriately
employ his “inherent power to control the judicial process and
litigation” 171 to sanction the failure as a means of “leveling the playing
field.” 172 The sanction may include permitting the jury to draw an
adverse inference from the absent evidence 173 or even result in the
“death” of the party’s claims or defenses. 174
Moreover, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), the leading
codification of the common law rule, does little to answer the question
of whether forfeiture by wrongdoing should be properly characterized as
a preliminary question of evidentiary admissibility for the purpose of
evaluating the constitutionality of the judge/jury fact-finding allocation.
The cases cited by the Advisory Committee in support of Rule 804(b)(6)
uniformly applied forfeiture by wrongdoing as a sanction for conduct
interfering with the conduct of the judge’s proceedings, but did not
apply the Rule reflexively. 175 The history of the doctrine before the
169. Id. (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 374).
170. See Asian Jade Soc’y of N.Y. & N.J. Inc. v. Port Auth., 601 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
171. Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001).
172. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995).
173. See Mosaid Tech. Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.N.J. 2004)
(discussing “spoliation inference” sanction).
174. See, e.g., Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that
dismissal was warranted where plaintiff sold vehicle for salvage without notice to defendant despite
defendant’s request to examine vehicle).
175. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2nd Cir. 1982) (applying doctrine where
key prosecution witness was murdered on third day of defendant’s trial on drug charges); United States
v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2nd Cir. 1992) (witness withdrew from plea agreement requiring
cooperation with government prosecution of defendant after receiving threatening letters from
defendant); United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 789 (2nd Cir. 1984) (witnesses in conspiracy
case); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1982) (murder-by-hire defendant found to have caused
witness to refuse to testify); United State v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358–59 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court’s admission of murdered
witness’s grand jury testimony as substantive evidence on RICO charges that were already pending
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Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted supports its characterization as
a rule of equity designed to remove any supposed benefit that the
defendant might achieve by witness tampering. 176
Consequently, any comparison drawn between preliminary questions
of evidentiary admissibility, which Gaudin recognized are properly
allocated to the judge, and forfeiture by wrongdoing seem misplaced.
When applied reflexively, it is a penalty placed on a defendant for
allegedly committing a crime that he has not yet been convicted of
committing, with the penalty being the admission of evidence that the
government believes will increase the likelihood of conviction. The
context suggests that the judge’s fact-finding is very closely intertwined
with the jury’s fact-finding and, perhaps more troubling, is expressly
designed to determine whether the defendant committed the crime he is
charged with committing.
Adding a requirement that the court also find a purpose to keep the
victim from being a witness—which the Giles Court held is
constitutionally required only when the government seeks to admit
testimonial statements—does not alter the basic dilemma presented by
the trial court’s use of forfeiture to sanction the conduct being charged
through the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. 177 First,
Gaudin instructs that the criminal defendant is entitled to have every
element decided by the jury. 178 If the jury does not decide each element
by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the defendant has not been
afforded the full extent of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 179 The purpose requirement does not address the question
of whether the required judicial fact-finding on an element of the crime
charged changes the burden of proof regarding that same element. Thus,
before the murder of the witness; indictment was amended to add charge of violating the witness’s civil
rights but the witness’s grand jury testimony was not offered in support of that charge of the indictment).
None of these cases involved the reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Thevis suggests the
great care that was sometimes taken by courts to avoid reflexive application. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 627–
28. The witness was murdered after testifying before the grand jury and after the grand jury issued the
RICO indictment. Id. The government then obtained a second indictment adding a charge of violating
the witness’s civil rights. Id. At trial, the government asserted that the grand jury testimony should be
admitted as evidence supporting the RICO claims under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, but did
not assert that the evidence should be considered in support of the civil rights claim. Id. at 627. The
court permitted the government to present evidence of the civil rights claim first, then, after that
evidence had been presented to the jury, the court applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to admit
the grand jury testimony in support of only the RICO charges. Id. at 628.
176. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878).
177. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court noted that intent or motive for a crime is
“more often than not the sine qua non of a violation of criminal law.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 493 n.18 (2000).
178. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511–12, 522–23 (1995).
179. Id.
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while adding a purpose requirement may avoid question-begging, it does
not address the potential conflict with Gaudin’s holding and reasoning.
Second, when applying forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively in a
homicide case, the purpose inquiry does not protect the integrity of the
homicide trial’s proceedings. Where a defendant prevents a witness
who would be expected to testify against him at trial from appearing,
forfeiture operates to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.180
But when that defendant is brought before the court for allegedly
murdering a victim who might have testified at some future or other
proceeding or might have cooperated with the police about another
crime, the defendant has not thwarted or in any way interfered with the
murder trial. 181 Regardless of the defendant’s motive for killing a
victim, her conduct has not achieved the goal that purportedly supports
the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing—she has not “thwarted the
normal operation of the criminal justice system by virtue of the wrongful
act.” 182 Because the rule is not being applied to preserve the integrity of
the trial itself, it seems incongruous to assert that the purpose factfinding relates to a legitimate equitable interest in protecting the
integrity of the trial proceedings.
A hypothetical demonstrates this incongruity. Assume that Davis
kills his spouse to prevent her testimony at a divorce proceeding, and
then is hailed before the court for her homicide. In the divorce
proceeding, the unavailability of his spouse creates a benefit to Davis
and also represents an interference with that proceeding. In the
homicide proceeding, the unavailability of Davis’s spouse does not alter
the ordinary availability of witnesses and cannot be said to interfere with
the homicide trial. 183 The purpose of killing the victim does not relate to
the equitable interest in having the homicide trial proceed without
improper or illegal interference. Thus, the Supreme Court’s addition of
purpose to the required fact-finding does not provide a principled basis
to conclude that the homicide defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendments
are adequately protected.

180. Camparet-Cassani, supra note 155, at 1196 (Forfeiture “partially offsets the perpetrator’s
rewards for his misconduct.”).
181. See id. at 1192.
182. Id. at 1207.
183. Indeed, if Davis’s spouse was alive, his homicide trial could not proceed—there could be no
more effective means of interfering with the homicide trial than to produce the victim alive.
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B. Allocation to the Judge: Undermining the Jury?
The context of forfeiture by wrongdoing demonstrates that it should
not be deemed a question of evidentiary admissibility for the purpose of
assessing the judge/jury fact-finding allocation. Therefore, closer
scrutiny should be given to the effect of judicial allocation of the
required fact-findings on the defendant’s right to have every element of
the criminal charges decided by the jury by the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. 184 If courts remove the right to confront witnesses, as
well as the right to make hearsay objections, on the basis of a judicial
finding that the defendant committed the homicide and had a purpose of
preventing the victim from being a witness or cooperating with
authorities, or admit non-testimonial hearsay on the basis of the judicial
determination that the defendant killed the victim, then there is a
significant risk that an erroneous fact-finding will interfere with the
jury’s determination of whether the defendant committed the homicide.
The judicial fact-finding affects the jury both in its fact-finding role and
its role of evaluating the credibility of witnesses, 185 and indeed, is
calculated to affect the trial’s outcome. 186
1. Complete Circularity
In Giles, the Court acknowledged that “a prior judicial assessment
that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well with the right to
trial by jury.” 187 Adding the requirement that a purpose of the killing be
to prevent the victim from being a witness—a fact-finding thought to be
different from the one engaged in by the jury—was described as a means
of avoiding the problem of complete circularity between judicial and
184. When a judge admits evidence based in part on her view that the defendant committed the act
of homicide as charged, the effect is to reduce the jury’s discretionary power by treating that defendant
differently than other homicide defendants. The jury’s acquittal power is designed to allow juries to
“protect the defendant’s liberty, not to threaten it.” Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal
Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 49 n.63 (2003).
185. The circularity is particularly troublesome given the differences between judge and jury;
judges may view evidence through an institutional bias that could affect the fact-finding process. See id.
at 72 (“[B]ecause the judge is a repeat player, she might be more inclined to favor the government’s
view of the facts as the government also is a repeat player in the criminal justice process.”).
186. The position that forfeiture by wrongdoing has as its primary purpose the elimination of the
benefit that the defendant would have achieved by the killing does not support reflexive application of
forfeiture by wrongdoing. First, the victim of a homicide could never testify at the homicide trial; there
is no difference between the availability of a victim killed in a random act of violence and the victim
killed because the victim is a threatened witness to some other proceeding. Thus, only the punitive and
deterrent purposes of the doctrine are served when it is applied reflexively in the homicide case.
187. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008). Part II-D-2 of the Court’s opinion found
support only from Justices Roberts, Thomas and Alito.
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jury decision-making. 188 The addition of purpose does not solve the
circularity problem identified by the Supreme Court. First, it does not
always remove the complete circularity that “does not sit well with the
right to trial by jury.” 189 Even in those cases where complete circularity
does not exist, Gaudin’s requirement that “every element” be submitted
to the jury casts some doubt on the legitimacy of solving the circularity
problem by requiring additional fact-finding.
In those jurisdictions that provide enhancements for murders intended
to prevent a witness from testifying, the purpose element of forfeiture by
wrongdoing merely cements complete unity with the elements of the
charges against the defendant. 190 Following Giles, at least one state
supreme court has found that the jury’s verdict finding the defendant
guilty of the aggravating circumstances established the correctness of
the trial court’s fact findings for purposes of applying forfeiture by
wrongdoing reflexively, 191 aptly demonstrating the complete circularity
that the Giles plurality sought to avoid by requiring that a purpose of the
homicide be to prevent the victim from being a witness. In other words,
the mens rea that equity is said to demand may be the same mens rea
that the jury will consider as an element of one or more of the charges.
In cases where this complete circularity exists, allocation of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing fact-findings to the judge creates a very real
risk that if the judge’s fact-findings are erroneous, the jury’s factfindings will have been infected by that error. Allowing the judge to
pre-judge the defendant’s guilt using the preponderance standard creates
a risk that different courts could reach different outcomes. In one case,
the defendant will be allowed to make his Sixth Amendment and
hearsay objections while in another he will be stripped of them. There is
a significant risk that the defendant stripped of his rights will be
convicted where if these rights were retained, he may not have been
convicted.
Moreover, requiring a finding of purpose does not eliminate the
complete unity between the judicial fact-finding that the defendant
188. Id. at 353. See also id. at 378 (Souter, J., concurring) (“The only thing saving admissibility
and liability determinations from question begging would be (in a jury case) the distinct functions of
judge and jury: judges would find by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant killed (and so
would admit the testimonial statement), while the jury could so find only on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Equity demands something more than this near circularity before the right to confrontation is
forfeited, and more is supplied by showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying.”).
189. Id. at 353.
190. See, e.g., State v. Fry, 926 N.E.2d 1239, 1262 (Ohio 2010) (holding that forfeiture by
wrongdoing applied in case in which jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of murder and
aggravating circumstance of purposely killing the victim to prevent testimony, or in retaliation for
testimony, in a criminal proceeding).
191. Id.
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caused the victim to be unavailable and the homicide charge—both the
judge and the jury must decide whether the defendant killed the
victim. 192 If, as Gaudin holds, judicial determination of any element of
the crime charged violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury, then the additional requirement that a purpose of the killing
be to prevent the victim from being a witness does not answer the
question of whether the court may prejudge an element of the crime
charged, thereby making the prosecutor’s case less burdensome. 193
Thus, because there is complete unity between the judge’s fact-finding
and at least one element of the crime charged and because this factfinding forms the basis for a sanction that is calculated to aid the
prosecution and harm the defense, the reflexive application of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine has troubling implications for the
constitutional rights addressed by the Gaudin Court.
A related concern is the allocation of witness credibility to the judge.
A court that applies forfeiture by wrongdoing reflexively must reject the
defendant’s version of events if a defense is raised. 194 When forfeiture
by wrongdoing is applied reflexively, the credibility questions to be
decided by the court closely align with the credibility questions that the
jury will address. Federal Rule of Evidence 412(c)—the Rape Shield
rule—was substantively amended in 1994 to remove the following
sentence:
Notwithstanding subdivision (b) of Rule 104, if the relevancy of the
evidence which the accused seeks to offer in trial depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court, at the hearing in chambers or
at a subsequent hearing in chambers scheduled for such purpose, shall
accept evidence on the issue of whether such condition of fact is fulfilled
and shall determine such issue. 195

The Advisory Committee recognized that the amendment was
necessary to avoid undermining a defendant’s right to trial by jury as

192. Although Giles called purpose a separate fact-finding that eliminated complete circularity
between judge and jury fact-findings, the distinction may be more apparent than real in many homicide
cases. The Supreme Court pointed out in Apprendi v. New Jersey when it held that a state law hate
crime sentence enhancement “define[d] a particular kind of prohibited intent, and a particular intent is
more often than not the sine qua non of a violation of a criminal law.” 530 U.S. 446, 493 n.18 (2000).
193. Furthermore, it is not clear that “purpose” is truly meaningfully distinct from “motive” or
“intent,” which, in a homicide case, could be an element of the crime and thus intertwined with the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493 n.18 (“[A] particular intent is more
often than not the sine qua non of a violation in criminal law.”).
194. People v. Moore, No. 01-CA-1760, 2004 WL 1690247 (Colo. App. July 29, 2004) (defendant
found guilty of criminal negligence).
195. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 412.
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well as the constitutional right to due process. 196 The Advisory
Committee indicated that a rule that allowed the judge to admit the
defendant’s evidence of prior consensual activities with the victim if the
judge believed the defendant, but exclude the evidence if the judge
concluded that the defendant’s evidence was not credible, would violate
the right to trial by jury. 197 This raises the question whether there is any
principled basis to distinguish between a rule that excludes the evidence
proffered by the defendant based on the court’s determination that the
defendant’s version of the facts is untrue, and a rule that admits the
prosecutor’s evidence based on the same conclusion about the
defendant’s credibility.
In any homicide case in which a defense is asserted, reflexive
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing necessarily turns on the judge’s
view of the defendant’s credibility, including the judge’s view of the
defendant’s affirmative defenses. Consider the Jensen case—a highprofile case in which the defendant was convicted of murdering his wife
by poisoning her. 198 The asserted defense was that the victim had been
depressed and taken her own life, framing the defendant. 199 Before her
death, the victim wrote a letter to a police detective, which was to be
delivered in the event anything happened to her. 200 In the letter, the
victim prospectively pinned her husband as the cause of her death. 201 In
order to admit the letter under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, the
trial court first had to reject the defendant’s version of events, finding
the prosecutor’s version to be more credible. 202
If excluding the defendant’s proffered evidence under the prior Rape
Shield rule was considered to be a likely violation of the right to a jury
trial by substituting the judge’s evaluation of witness credibility for the
196. Id.
197. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 396 (5th ed. 1990) (“This is quite
a bit different from having Judges rule on most competency questions [where the] Judge is not usurping
the function of the jury. [In such cases t]he Judge is not addressing the merits of the case and deciding
whether one side or the other is truthful. Rather, the Judge is assuring that the evidence meets the usual
evidentiary standards. But when the Judge decides whether or not a defense is true or false and decides
that on the basis of the credibility of the witnesses, the Judge is doing what the jury is supposed to do in
a serious criminal case covered by the Sixth Amendment.”).
198. Jay Schadler & Susan B. Miller, Death Foretold, 20/20 (ABC television broadcast Feb. 29,
2008), available at http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=4359389.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. State v. Jensen 727 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Wis. 2007). See also United States v. Garcia-Meza,
403 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming trial court’s application of forfeiture by wrongdoing before
Supreme Court imposed purpose requirement; in his defense, defendant asserted lack of premeditation,
which is inconsistent with having a “purpose” for the homicide).
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jury’s, then the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit the
victim’s words in the homicide case seems equally troubling. While it is
true that refusing to admit the defendant’s evidence of innocence
implicates due process as well as the right to trial by jury, 203 that
difference should not affect the right to trial by jury analysis. The test
for whether the right to trial by jury has been violated is whether the
device has undermined the jury’s fact-finding function. 204 If that is the
correct test, then it seems unpersuasive to distinguish the trial court’s
consideration of witness credibility when deciding reflexive application
of forfeiture by wrongdoing questions from the credibility allocation that
led to the amendment of Rule 412. In either instance, the admission or
exclusion of the evidence holds great potential to be outcome
determinative against the defendant.
2. Reducing the Burden of Proof
Although forfeiture by wrongdoing is not a preliminary question of
evidentiary admissibility that turns on evidentiary competence, its
application does result in the admission of otherwise inadmissible
inculpatory evidence. Admitting such evidence has a direct impact on
whether the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been met.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that “guilt in a criminal
case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence
confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to
some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of
evidence consistent with that standard.” 205 The rules of evidence,
having evolved from the common law and the criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights, play an important role in assessing whether the jury
has determined the defendant’s guilt of every element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Rules of evidence are protections
designed, at least in part, to ensure that the defendant is not wrongfully
convicted by placing too much power with the jury to act
capriciously. 206 When a court strips those protections from the homicide
203. Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 412.
204. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993).
205. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (affirming court’s consideration of
evidence at suppression hearing seeking to exclude evidence seized during search of vehicle).
206. One reason for rules of evidence
is mistrust of juries . . . and this point goes far to prove that faith in juries is limited. The
hearsay doctrine exists, for example, largely because we think lay jurors cannot properly
evaluate statements made outside their presence, and the rules governing character
evidence assume that juries place too much weight on such proof or employ it improperly
for punitive purposes.
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defendant on the ground that he in fact killed the victim (whether the
court also must determine the defendant’s purposes in committing the
crime), the effect is to give an advantage to the government’s case.
When a defendant engages in witness tampering, the result is harm to
the government’s proof because a witness who would have testified at
trial is no longer available. But when a defendant is charged with
murder, the victim is not a witness in that proceeding, and there has been
no harm to the prosecution’s murder case. For example, assume that a
homicide defendant would duly lodge her hearsay and Confrontation
Clause objections to the proffered victim statements—she in fact tells
the court that she objects. Assume also that the prosecutor’s response is
that the defendant forfeited the right to object to the admission of the
victim’s words because the defendant made the victim unavailable to
testify with the purpose of making that victim unavailable as a witness at
some proceeding. Before the court can rule that the defendant forfeited
the right to object, the court must first conclude that the defendant did
something to make the victim unavailable as a witness—i.e., that the
defendant killed the victim as the prosecution charges. Moreover,
because forfeiture by wrongdoing requires that this act be wrongful, the
court’s ruling on the question of whether the defendant killed the victim
is likely to incorporate a factual determination that the killing was not
justified or excused. In other words, the court must decide that the
defendant’s alleged defenses, if any, are invalid or untrue.
Gaudin instructs that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled
to have the jury decide every element of the crime charged by the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. In a homicide case, this includes
the question of whether he or she killed the victim. The court cannot
take these issues from the jury. The court cannot give a directed verdict
of conviction, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt. 207
Nor can the court affect the jury’s consideration of each element of the
crime charged by applying a conclusive presumption to any such
element. 208 The question is whether anything less than a conclusive
presumption can constitute a “device” that “undermines” the rights
linked in Gaudin. In other words, is judicial interference with the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, based in whole or in part on factfindings that represent circularity with the jury’s required consideration

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 2 (4th ed. 2009). For a contrary view,
see Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Trying Issues, 5 TEX. L. REV. 18, 24 (1926) (arguing that
evidence should not be excluded from jury’s consideration).
207. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105–06 (1895).
208. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10 (1999).
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of each element of the crime, constitutionally suspect? 209
Using forfeiture, a court can admit evidence that is (a) strong, (b)
possibly un-confronted and untested by cross-examination, and (c)
otherwise inadmissible—and therefore potentially unreliable,
untrustworthy, or susceptible to misuse or overreliance by the jury. 210
Removing the defendant’s right to object to the admission of the
victim’s words makes it more likely that a jury will find the element of
killing the victim to have been proven than if the court had not found
that the defendant killed the victim as a predicate for finding forfeiture
of the right to object. 211
What’s the effect on the jury? The jury is instructed to apply the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, so one might naturally assert that
the jury’s function has not been impaired. But consider the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt—which is constitutionally protected
and, as the Supreme Court has stated, incorporates “a fundamental value
determination by our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
than to let a guilty defendant go free.” 212 The higher burden of proof in
criminal cases may result in more factually guilty defendants going free
than if the preponderance of the evidence standard were applied, but it
also reduces the likelihood that a factually innocent defendant is
convicted. 213
The difference between the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and a
lesser standard, such as the preponderance of the evidence, has much to
do with the quantum of proof. As evidence mounts, one first meets the
preponderance hurdle and then, with more evidence, the reasonable
doubt hurdle. In other words, evidence only sufficient to prove that a
defendant killed the victim by a preponderance of the evidence is
insufficient to prove that the defendant killed the victim beyond
reasonable doubt. To meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the
prosecution needs more or more powerful evidence than it would to
209. The criminal defendant’s right to trial by jury “differs fundamentally from other rights to trial
by jury” thus suggesting “that the criminal defendant’s right carries unique implications for evidence
rules that allow courts to interfere with a jury fact-finding.” Katherine Goldwasser, Essay, Vindicating
The Right To Trial By Jury And The Requirement of Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: A Critique Of
The Conventional Wisdom About Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L. J. 621, 642 (1998).
210. Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 39, at 61 (positing that forfeiture by wrongdoing permits
admission of unreliable statements contrary to the Sixth Amendment).
211. See, e.g., Tom Kertscher, Legal Standard to Be Tested; Jensen Could Get Another Trial,
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Feb. 24, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 3633101 (Westlaw)
(reporting that after the trial of accused murderer Mark Jensen, several jurors disclosed that the victim’s
hearsay letter, admitted through reflexive application of forfeiture by wrongdoing, was “perhaps the
most important piece of evidence” in favor of conviction).
212. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
213. Goldwasser, supra note 209, at 644.
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meet the lower preponderance of the evidence standard.
The victim’s words may constitute the more or more powerful
evidence that is necessary for the prosecution to meet its burden of
proof. This proposition is supported by the impact that the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Crawford had on domestic violence prosecutions and
the numerous discussions the ruling spawned about the need to restore
the victim’s voice. 214 For many cases, whether the victim’s hearsay
statements are admissible will affect whether the case is prosecutable. 215
Indeed, if this were not true, prosecutors would not argue for an
expansive use of forfeiture because there would be no need to. The
admission of the victim’s statements thus has the effect of reducing the
burden on the government, effectively making it easier to prove guilt of
a homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. By making it easier for the
government to prove guilt, the forfeiture ruling has an effect that is akin
to reducing the standard of proof.
The United States Supreme Court tacitly accepted that the admission
of inculpatory evidence reduces the burden of proof, in Carmell v.
Texas. 216 There, in a 5–4 decision, 217 the Court held that the
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause was violated when a Texas statute
was revised to dispense with a corroboration condition on testimony of
teen victims of sexual offenses, thereby making the victim’s testimony
admissible, and applied retroactively to the defendant. 218 In its analysis
214. Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 77, at 772 (discussing examples of Crawford’s
impact, including dismissal of “up to a dozen domestic violence cases per day [in Dallas County, Texas
alone] because of evidentiary problems related to Crawford”).
215. Id.; Chase, supra note 77, at 1112 (noting that “without the victim’s statements in evidence,
great difficulty frequently arises in attempting to prove” acts of domestic violence).
216. 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
217. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Breyer formed the majority; Justice Ginsberg
dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy. Id. at 515, 553.
218. The Texas statute originally provided:
A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 22.011, or Section 22.021, Penal Code, is
supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the
victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within six
months after the date on which the offense is alleged to have occurred. The requirement
that the victim inform another person of an alleged offense does not apply if the victim
was younger than 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offense.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (Vernon 1983). The statute was amended to change the age of
the victim from fourteen to eighteen. As to the defendant,
four counts stand or fall depending on whether the child victim exception applies. Under
the old law, the exception would not apply, because the victim was more than 14 years
old at the time of the alleged offenses. Under the new law, the exception would apply,
because the victim was under 18 years old at that time. In short, the validity of four of
petitioner’s convictions depends on whether the old or new law applies to his case,
which, in turn, depends on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the application of
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of the Ex Post Facto Clause issue, the Court analogized eliminating the
corroboration requirement to
retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the
punishment for an existing offense, or lowering the burden of proof . . . .
In each of these instances, the government subverts the presumption of
innocence by reducing the number of elements it must prove to overcome
that presumption; by threatening such severe punishment so as to induce a
plea to a lesser offense or a lower sentence; or by making it easier to meet
the threshold for overcoming the presumption. Reducing the quantum of
evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof is simply another way of
achieving the same end. 219

Just as revision of the Texas statute in Carmell allowed previously
inadmissible evidence—uncorroborated testimony by fourteen to
eighteen year old sexual assault victims—to be submitted to the jury, the
forfeiture by wrongdoing sanction likewise admits previously
inadmissible evidence. By eliminating objections to evidence when the
court determines that the homicide defendant killed the victim, forfeiture
by wrongdoing similarly makes it easier for the government to overcome
the presumption of innocence and convince the jury of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
To be sure, when forfeiture is applied to a case in which the defendant
causes a witness other than the victim to be unavailable, the effect on the
government’s burden is similarly reduced. But in the homicide case
where the homicide is the act giving rise to forfeiture the difference is
that the court is prejudging an element of the crime, which the jury must
ultimately decide and is using that prejudgment to alter the burden of
proof. In effect, if the court finds that the defendant killed the victim
with a purpose of preventing future testimony in some other proceeding,
the defendant has forfeited the right to have the issue of whether he
killed the victim decided by the jury under the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.
Where a defendant is being tried for a crime other than making the
witness unavailable, there is no conflict between the defendant’s right to
have the jury decide the facts and the judge’s finding that the defendant
warrants forfeiture of the right to confront a missing witness. For
example, if the defendant is accused of conspiracy and the prosecutor
the new version of Article 38.07 to his case.
Carmel, 529 U.S. at 518–19. Highlighting the importance of context to evaluating the constitutionality
of a device, the majority characterized the Texas statute as affecting the sufficiency of the evidence,
while the dissent characterized it as an evidentiary provision dictating the circumstances under which the
jury could evaluate victim testimony. Id. at 553.
219. Carmel, 529 U.S. at 532–33.
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has been unable to secure the trial attendance of witnesses because the
defendant’s threats caused the witnesses to flee to Canada, the judge’s
determination that the defendant threatened the witnesses is distinct
from the matter before the jury: whether the defendant is guilty of
conspiracy. Similarly, if the defendant is accused of domestic violence
and the prosecutor demonstrates that the victim of the domestic violence
is unavailable to testify due to the defendant’s separate wrongdoing
intended to keep the victim from attending the trial, the court’s
application of forfeiture by wrongdoing requires a finding that the
defendant wrongfully acted to secure the witness’s unavailability to
testify and does not bear on the question before the jury: whether the
defendant is guilty of domestic violence.
C. Impermissible Comment on the Evidence?
A somewhat less visible concern is the wisdom of allocating factfinding in the reflexive case to the court even if courts and
commentators alike express no discomfort with the effect on the
defendant’s rights under Gaudin. Professor Friedman makes the point
that
if the judge does make the factual findings necessary to support a
conclusion of forfeiture, he or she does not announce to the jury, “Ladies
and gentlemen, you should know that the reason you have heard this
statement by the victim is that I have determined as a preliminary matter
that the accused murdered her. Of course, you shouldn’t let my decision
on that point affect you in performing the job assigned to you.” 220

While it is true that the jury is not told of the ruling and does not know
why victim hearsay statements were admitted, this Article suggests that
in some ways, in today’s world of modern communication technology,
this makes the situation worse, not better.
There seems little dispute that “the trial judge ‘may express his
opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all
matters of fact are submitted to their determination.’”221 The Court has
also warned that particular care is required before a judge comments
upon the guilt of the defendant, for “[a]lthough the power of the judge to
express an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant exists, it should be
exercised cautiously and only in exceptional cases.” 222 Applying these
220. Richard D. Friedman, Does an Accused Forfeit the Confrontation Right by Murdering a
Witness, Absent a Purpose to Render Her Unavailable?, 35 PREVIEW OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
CASES 364 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/ABA_Preview7_2008.pdf.
221. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933).
222. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
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principles to reflexive forfeiture by wrongdoing, the judge has, in fact,
expressed an opinion on the defendant’s guilt and inferentially
communicated that opinion by admitting evidence that makes it all the
more likely that the jury will find the defendant guilty, without making
clear the jury’s right to disagree with the judge’s opinion. Especially in
the modern electronic age, a juror could question or even determine
whether the admission of the evidence was based on such an opinion—
an infection of the jury that is difficult to cure through instruction. 223 It
is not a far stretch to suggest that one or more jurors in any case either
may discern that certain evidence was admitted under the doctrine, or
suppose that it was, even if it was not.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors and courts have increasingly used the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine as a means of circumventing the exclusionary
effects of the rule against hearsay and the right to confront witnesses to
admit the victim’s hearsay statements to prove that the defendant is
guilty of the crime of killing the victim. Using the doctrine in this
manner raises constitutional concerns that merit closer examination.
The vexing evidentiary problems in the prosecution of domestic
violence cases as a result of the rule against hearsay and the criminal
defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses deserve redress,
but redress ought not be in the form of undermining the rights conferred
by the Constitution. Expansion of the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing to the reflexive case seems poised to continue well beyond
its original scope. 224 The literature offers a number of options that could
serve as alternatives to the reflexive application of the forfeiture by
wrongdoing doctrine, such as creating pretrial opportunities to crossexamine victims so that their statements are confronted, 225 creating a
hearsay exception that admits the statements of unavailable victims of
223. See, for example, CNN, Trials on Demand, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2008/news/
trials.on.demand/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011), which hosts selected video footage of portions of trials
and commentary about ongoing trials. See also, James Holderman, Ás Generations X, Y and Z
Determine the Jury’s Verdict, What Is The Judge’s Role?, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 343, 347–49 (2009)
(discussing Generation X, Y, and Z’s exposure to the internet and other technology); Erika Patrick,
Protecting The Defendant’s Right To A Fair Trial In The Information Age, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 71, 71 (2002)
(noting that the advent of the television and the internet has increased the media in which a trial of
public opinion can affect the outcome of a legal trial).
224. Marc C. McAllister, The Disguised Witness and Crawford’s Uneasy Tension with Craig:
Brining Uniformity to the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Jurisprudence, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 481, 534–
39 (2010) (arguing that forfeiture by wrongdoing should be applied to permit disguise of in-court
witnesses who are intimidated and fearful).
225. Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 77, at 786.
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violent crime concerning the crime and its perpetrator, 226 narrowly
tailoring the definition of “testimonial” for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, 227 providing increased protections for victims
before trial, 228 and expanding substantive criminal charges to permit
prosecution of batterers without the need for the victim’s testimony. 229
The United States Supreme Court has on many occasions reaffirmed
the importance of the right to trial by jury and the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. Because the right to trial by jury is so
fundamental to the concept of ordered liberty that it has been called the
“very palladium of free government,” 230 any potential for a rule of law
to undermine or invade it should receive very close attention. The
reasons for the use of forfeiture by wrongdoing in homicide cases,
measured against the potential to undermine the right to trial by jury,
may be insufficient to justify the means. If the criminal defendant really
is to be presumed innocent until a jury has found him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, if the jury really is to be the sole fact-finder, and if the
rules of evidence stand in part to protect the defendant’s constitutional
right to a fair trial, then there is an obligation to give those principles
meaning and substance. If using forfeiture by wrongdoing to sanction
the defendant charged with murder for killing the victim is an intrusion
on the defendant’s constitutional right, then the invasion should not be
easily justified by the strong societal goal of convicting murderers and
batterers. As Blackstone wrote in 1769:
[H]owever convenient [any intrusion] may appear at first, (as doubtless
all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient) yet let it be
again remembered, that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of
justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more
substantial matters; that this inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the
nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and
that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and
spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous
concern. 231

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 800.
Chase, supra note 77, at 1119–21.
Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 77, at 814.
Id. at 816–17.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed. 1987).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 350 (1769).
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